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THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
LAW FIRM IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS*
This Article examines the structural evolution of the "firm counsel"
position from a volunteer, part-time position filled by an existing
partner to a specialized, often full-time position increasingly filled
by career in-house counsel. Based on focus groups and interviews
with firm counsel, as well as participant observation at meetings and
conferences aimed at firm counsel, I examine how the
professionalization of the firm counsel position affects: (1) the
definition of the firm as the client; (2) the authority of firm counsel
with partners; and (3) firm counsels' professional commitments and
attitudes about ethical rules.
I find that, from a regulatory standpoint, the professionalization of
firm counsel is a positive development. The increasing
formalization and specialization of the firm counsel position has.
helped to clarify the identity of the firm as a client without
compromising the authority or commitment of lawyers who serve in
that role. Although "professional" firm counsel-that is, full-time
firm counsel and those appointed from outside the firm-tend to
draw on different sources of authority than part-time firm counsel
who "grew up" in the firm, most respondents report that their role is
expanding and that they have sufficient authority to be effective. I
argue that professional networks among firm counsel are likely to
play a critical role in defining the future standards for law firm
regulation and urge legal ethics scholars to collaborate with firm
counsel in promoting the vibrancy of such networks.
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Research for this project was funded by
the Open Society Institute and the Harvard Law School Program on the Legal Profession.
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INTRODUCTION
There never was a general counsel at our firm before me.
There was a person at the law firm who, if there was a problem,
he would handle the problem. That was maybe three, four
years ago.'
In May 2004, Shearman & Sterling named John Shutkin of
KPMG to be the law firm's first in-house general counsel.2 Although
by 2004 there was nothing surprising about a law firm appointing
"general counsel,"3 it was noteworthy that Shearman & Sterling
1. Formal remarks of "O1," partner and general counsel at a large, New York City-
based law firm, during a 2005 meeting of law firm in-house counsel. Further details about
the meeting are withheld to preserve the speaker's anonymity. For an explanation of the
notation used to identify confidential sources for this Article, see infra notes 55-56, 59-60.
2. Mary Mullally, Analysis: The Adviser to the Advisers, LEGAL WEEK, May 8, 2004,
available at http://www.legalweek.com/Viewltem.asp?id=20987 (reporting that Shutkin
had been appointed). Shutkin started at Shearman & Sterling in September 2004. Id.
3. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44
ARIz. L. REV. 559, 559-70 (2002) (examining the emergence of in-house counsel in thirty-
two law firms); Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even Lawyers Need Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at C1 (reporting law firms' increasing reliance on in-house
counsel); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation
1516 [Vol. 84
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appointed someone from outside its own ranks. In most law firms,
the general counsel is a long-time partner- who first played an
informal advising role within the firm.4 In a 2005 survey of general
counsel at Am Law 200 firms,5 all fifty-three general counsel who
responded had been appointed from within their own firms.6
Even more newsworthy was the fact that Shutkin previously was
general counsel at KPMG International.7 Prior to that, he was
general counsel at Kodak Polychrome Graphics, and prior to that, he
was deputy general counsel at KPMG (U.S.). 8  Shutkin, in other
words, was a career in-house general counsel. His cross-over
appointment from accounting to law thus marked an important step
in the professionalization of law firm in-house counsel: the
appointment of a career specialist over a firm (or even industry)
insider.
"Professionalization" refers to the process by which an
occupational group becomes increasingly specialized, organized, and
autonomous, developing distinct knowledge claims,9  titles, °
Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 129 (2005) (noting the increasing use of the title
"general counsel").
4. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 565 (emphasizing the "evolutionary"
nature of the in-house position); Cathleen Flahardy et al., Stepping Out: Partner. Law
Firm GC. Consultant. Entrepreneur Professional Poker Player. Five Options for
Adventurous In-House Lawyers, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2005, at 46, 50, available at
www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/pdfs/SteppingOut2005.pdf (reporting that
"firms usually promote from within" to fill the role of law firm general counsel). The
position appears to be evolving the same way in UK firms. See Mullally, supra note 2
(reporting that "UK firms are increasingly appointing one dedicated person, usually a
partner, to oversee risk and compliance issues on a full time basis").
5. See ALTMAN WEIL, INC., RESULTS OF CONFIDENTIAL "FLASH" SURVEY ON
LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSEL 2 (2005), http://www.altmanweil.com/dirdocs/resource/
d0fle347-e9Ob-40ae-9b92-808a7eff6ffd document.pdf [hereinafter FLASH SURVEY]. Am
Law 200 firms are the 200 top-grossing United States law firms, as measured by the
American Lawyer Magazine. See John O'Connor, A Guide to Our Methodology, AM.
LAW., Aug. 2005, at 89, 89.
6. See Flahardy et al., supra note 4, at 50 (citing Ward Bower, the principal at
Altman Weil who conducted the survey).
7. Lisa Lerer, A Safe Pioneer, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2004, at 32, 32 (stating that Shutkin
had been general counsel at KPMG International).
8. Business Wire, Shearman & Sterling Hires John Shutkin as General Counsel, Jul.
15, 2004, http://www.prophet.net/quotes/stocknews.jsp?symbol=BE&article=
20040715290.2_f30e0007a27acebd.
9. See ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
EXPERT DIVISION OF LABOR 33-113 (1988) (arguing that the professions develop
through "jurisdictional" claims to exclusive competence); MAGALI SARFATfI LARSON,
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 180 (1977) (arguing that
"[tihe main instrument of professional advancement ... is the capacity to claim esoteric
and identifiable skills").
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associations,"1 and career tracks.": The so-called "strong" professions
are those in which this process leads to market monopoly and self-
regulation, such as medicine and law,13 but professionalization can be
defined more broadly to refer to the emergence and
institutionalization of any highly specialized, relatively autonomous
occupational group.14 It is in this broader sense that I use the term
here.
The emergence of in-house counsel in law firms began in the
early 1990s15 under a variety of titles, such as "ethics advisor,"
"conflicts partner," "loss prevention partner," and "general
counsel."16 Typically, the formal position grew out of a particular
partner's informal role or leadership on a committee, such that the
10. See THEODORE CAPLOW, THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 139 (1954); Harold L.
Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOc. 137, 144 (1964)
(emphasizing the importance of titles in the development of professional groups); see also
Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 n.1 (1989) (noting the evolution of the
title "corporate counsel" from "kept counsel" in the 1920s to "house counsel" in the 1930s
to "corporate counsel" today).
11. See ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 83 (arguing that having "a single, identifiable
national association" is a prerequisite of public and legal claims to exclusive jurisdiction
over certain types of work, though not of workplace claims); ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL
KNOWLEDGE 186-87 (1986) (noting that "[tihe professional association is the most
obvious manifestation of formal organization among professions").
12. See ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 129 (arguing that "[e]very profession has typical
careers.., one official pattern and a variety of unofficial ones"); Robert Rosen, Research
Note, "Proletarianizing" Lives: Researching Careers, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 703, 703, 710
(1999) (suggesting that the "proletarianization of the professional," which traditionally has
been defined in terms of a loss of control over work, may also result from a loss of the
ability to have "careers of certain kinds").
13. See RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 132-33 (1979) (defining "strong"
professions).
14. See ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 7, 15 (criticizing the profession's literature for
focusing too much theoretical attention on "the familiar examples of American law and
medicine"). Abbott defines professionalization as the process by which occupational
groups establish exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of work. Id. at 20; see also
LARSON, supra note 9, at xvi (defining professionalization as "the process by which
producers of special services [seek] to constitute and control a market for their expertise").
15. See Peter R. Jarvis, Ethics Advisors Watch Over Firms, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992,
at 15; Daniel Kennedy, New Trend is General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 29;
Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like Their
Clients, to Look Inside for Advice, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al (noting the emergence
of law firm in-house counsel).
16. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 565-66 (reporting the titles of in-house
counsel in thirty-two law firms).
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contours of the position varied significantly from firm to firm. 7
However, most firm counsel focused primarily on keeping the firm
"out of trouble;"' 8 that is, on promoting compliance with professional
regulation,' 9 especially conflicts-of-interest rules.E° Initially, most
partners who served as firm counsel spent only a fraction of their time
in that role and were not compensated directly for in-house service.2'
As one such partner explained, "You're expected ... as a partner to
pick up administrative duties around the firm, and that was one of the
things I ended up doing. "
E2
Over the past few years, the in-house position has begun to be
institutionalized in large law firms, with a seeming coalescence
around the title "general counsel. '23 More firms are creating formal,
compensated in-house positions E4 and firm counsel are becoming
more specialized, devoting an increasing percentage of their time to
the in-house role .2  Thirty-two percent of the general counsel
17. Id. at 565-69 (emphasizing the idiosyncratic development of the in-house position
within firms). As one "ethics partner" noted, "Go to any firm around the country and
you'll find a different way in which the ethics function evolves in that firm, that's
consistent with that firm's practice ... structure . . . [and] culture ...." Id. at 565.
18. Id. at 583 (quoting a full-time "special counsel" at a large Philadelphia firm).
19. See id. at 566-67 (examining the substantive jurisdictions of firm in-house
counsel); Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 103, 108-11 (2000) (describing their own in-
house practice at Stoel Rives, a Portland, Oregon firm).
20. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 566-67 (reporting the centrality of
conflicts issues).
21. Id. at 570-77 (examining the structure of the in-house position).
22. Id. at 572.
23. See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, Survey: More Firms Using Their Own GC, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 1, 2005, at 1; Leigh Jones, More Firms Hire General Counsel: GCs
Help Reduce the Risk of Liability, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 2005, at 1; Jaime Levy, More Firms
See Benefit of Using In-House General Counsel, CHI. LAW., July 2004, at 28; Jane Pribeck,
More and More Law Firms Designating Their Own 'In-House' General Counsel, MINN.
LAW., Sept. 26, 2005, at S-1 (special supplement); Nancy Rubin Stuart, A Lawyer's
Lawyer: More Firms Establish In-House General Counsel Positions, N.J. L.J., June 20,
2005, at 27; Charles Toutant, General Counsel Posts Popping up at Large Firms, Spurred
by Insurers, N.J. L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at 1; Peter D. Zeughauser, A Lawyers' Lawyer; Now
That a Handful of Law Firms are the Size of Mid-Cap Corporations, They are Finding
They Need a Dedicated General Counsel, AM. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 51-52.
24. Sixty-nine percent of Am Law 200 firms surveyed in 2005 have in-house general
counsel, up from 63% in 2004. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 1. The average
compensation for firm counsel in the 2005 survey was $493,292, up from $386,875 in 2004.
Id. at3.
25. The 2005 survey found that firm counsel devote an average of 753 hours per year
on in-house matters, down slightly from 775 in 2004. Id. However, this slight decrease
probably reflects the increasing number of new general counsel, rather than diminished
investment on the part of existing general counsel. All the in-house counsel in my sample
report that their role is expanding. See infra Part III.B. My findings on this point are
consistent with recent news reports. See Carly McElligott, Sincere Flattery, CORP.
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surveyed in 2005 were full-time in that role, up from 26% in 2004.26
Firm counsel also are becoming more organized, thanks primarily to
the efforts of insurers 27 and law firm consultants,2 8 who have begun to
sponsor roundtables and conferences for firm counsel. Some firm
counsel list their membership in these specialized networks on their
resumes.
29
From a regulatory standpoint, firms' increasing investment in
firm counsel is a promising development. Initial research suggests
that firm counsel tend to be strongly committed to ethics and
regulatory compliance" and may play a significant role in promoting
compliance procedures within firms.31 Not surprisingly, firm counsel
who are compensated directly for in-house service tend to be more
thorough and proactive than those who are not.32 Firm counsel who
give up outside practice to focus exclusively on the firm's interests
appear to be the most thorough and proactive of all.33 Such findings
COUNS., Aug. 2005, at 21 (discussing part-time general counsel at Holland & Knight and
Gibson Dunn); Pribeck, supra note 23 (discussing part-time general counsel at three
Minneapolis firms).
26. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3.
27. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 559-60 (noting the importance of the
Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society ("ALAS") in promoting the appointment of "loss
prevention counsel" within firms). ALAS holds a yearly conference for its loss prevention
counsel, which provides an opportunity for firm counsel to meet and exchange
information. Id. at 590.
28. The Hildebrandt Institute has been especially active in organizing events for "law
firm general counsel." In addition to its Law Firm General Counsel Roundtable, which is
an invitation-only event, Hildebrandt also sponsors an annual conference for law firm
general counsel. See FOURTH ANNUAL LAW FIRM GENERAL COUNSELS' FORUM: THE
CHANGING RISK ENVIRONMENT FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS (conference brochure
on file with author). Some law firms that specialize in malpractice defense also sponsor
conferences aimed in part at law firm general counsel. For instance, Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP sponsors an annual Legal Malpractice & Risk Management Conference
directed at "Professional Liability Practitioners, Law Firm Managing Partners & General
Counsel, In-House Corporate Counsel, and Legal Malpractice Insurance Professionals."
See 2006 Legal Malpractice & Risk Management Conference, http://www.lmrm.com (last
visited Apr. 18, 2006).
29. For instance, Ronald E. Van Buskirk, Firm General Counsel at Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman, lists himself as a founding member of Hildebrandt's Law Firm
General Counsel Roundtable. See Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLC, Professionals,
Ronald E. Buskirk, http://www.pillsburylaw.com/cgi-bin/bvisapi.dll/portal/ep/profDetail.
do?bio=08957&tabld=3 (last visited Apr. 18,2006).
30. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 585-86 (examining the personal and
professional characteristics of firm counsel)..
31. Id. at 587-89 (examining firm counsels' strategies for promoting ethics and
regulatory compliance).
32. Id. at 573-77 (examining the effects of direct compensation on the scope and
substance of firm counsels' compliance efforts).
33. Id. at 580 (discussing the benefits of full-time firm counsel).
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suggest that increased investment in the firm counsel position will
bring increased attention to the compliance function.3 4
As firm counsel become more specialized and develop their own
professional networks, they also may become more independent from
the interests of powerful partners and firms' immediate economic
concerns.35 Some firms already have moved to establish the structural
independence of the position, by appointing firm counsel who are not
partners3 6 and do not sit on the management committee of the firm.37
Shutkin, for instance, is not a partner.38 According to David
Heleniak, the senior partner at Shearman & Sterling, "[w]e thought it
made sense to have an independent and fresh look at things, and we
wanted to have somebody who was not otherwise engaged in the
firm's business to do it."'3 9
34. See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity
Regulation, 4 LEGAL ETHICS 45, 61-62 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss, Entity Regulation]
(calling for the American Bar Association to promote the appointment of firm in-house
counsel); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm
Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 346-50 (2003) (arguing that the appointment of
in-house counsel will improve law firm self-regulation); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of
In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1757-65 (2005) [hereinafter Chambliss,
In-Firm Privilege] (explaining the benefits of firm counsel and arguing for broader
protection of in-firm privilege).
35. Research in other organizational contexts finds that membership in active
professional networks tends to boost the independence and authority of compliance
specialists within organizations. See, e.g., CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN
CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 174-79 (2002)
(discussing the importance of professional networks for compliance specialists generally);
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 412-45 (1999) (discussing the role of personnel
professionals in promoting the adoption of non-union grievance procedures within
organizations).
36. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 573 (discussing a respondent who had
"given up [his] rights to be compensated like a partner" in order to clarify his role as firm
counsel); Mullally, supra note 2 (discussing the pros and cons of firm counsel having
partnership status); Ed Thornton, A New Breed of Adviser, LEGAL DIRECTOR, Sept. 6,
2005, http://www.legalweek.comlViewltem.asp?id=24459 (discussing Shutkin's
appointment). On the other hand, the 2005 survey of Am Law 200 firms found that the
percentage of firm counsel who are partners had gone up since 2004, from 83% to 92%.
See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 2.
37. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 5 (finding that 26% of firm counsel serve on
their firm's governing committee, down from 40% in 2004). Firms' efforts to establish the
structural independence of the in-house position are driven in part by their concerns about
preserving the attorney-client privilege for communication between firm counsel and
other members of the firm. See Thornton, supra note 36 (quoting Ward Bower regarding
firms' concerns about privilege).
38. See Mullally, supra note 2 (quoting Shutkin). As Shutkin says, "I'm not doing this
role pro bono, but my compensation is not tied to the financial wherewithal of the firm
.. Id.
39. Lerer, supra note 7, at 32 (quoting Heleniak).
1522 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
At the same time, there may be limits to the authority and
effectiveness of specialized, full-time firm counsel. Some question
whether full-time firm counsel can command the respect of practicing
partners, especially on questions of business intake.4" Although law
firm management has become more bureaucratic as firms have
grown,41 many firms continue to be dominated by "partners with
power" 42 -that is, the partners who control the most business-
despite the constraints this imposes on risk management and strategic
planning.43 Telling a powerful rainmaker that he cannot bring in a big
client may be difficult for someone without an equity stake in the
firm. 44 Firm counsel who come from outside, in particular, may have
trouble establishing their credibility and authority with other lawyers
in the firm.45
Further, as law firms begin to recruit from outside, firm counsels'
personal and professional commitments may change. In addition to
becoming more independent, firm counsel may become more
detached, and less invested in the fortunes and reputation of the firm.
Whereas the first wave of firm counsel "grew up" in their firms,' and
many volunteered hundreds of hours of in-house service as a "labor
of love, 47 outsider firm counsel may be more likely to approach the
firm at arm's length and to identify primarily with other firm counsel
40. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 581 (quoting several part-time firm
counsel on this point).
41. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 86-124 (1988) (discussing law firms'
increasing tendency toward bureaucratic organization and management).
42. Id. at 5 (introducing this phrase).
43. Id. at 224-25 (stating that "[blureaucratization in the law firm will always be
subject to the prerogatives of the client-responsible elite"). Although Nelson's classic
study is almost twenty years old, the basic tension he identified persists. See Chambliss,
supra note 3, at 120-21 (discussing lawyers' resistance to bureaucratic management);
Jonathan E. Smaby, Kicking the Habit of a Reactive Approach, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004,
at S3 (criticizing lawyers' resistance to centralized management and strategic planning).
44. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 581 (discussing some potential
drawbacks of full-time in-house practice).
45. See id. at 581 (quoting a part-time firm counsel who said it would take "fifteen
years" for an outsider to build credibility in the firm); Flahardy et al., supra note 4, at 4
(quoting Richard Goshorn, general counsel at Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, as
saying, "I've heard people say 'there's no way you can come from outside and do this
job' ").
46. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 581 (reporting that most of the full-time
firm counsel in the study "grew up" practicing in their firms and thus came into the
position with personal credibility).
47. Id. at 585 (reporting that several volunteer, part-time firm counsel described their
services as a "labor of love"). As one volunteer said, "It's something of a personal
commitment that keeps my door open, effectively, for people to come to my office." Id.
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rather than other lawyers in their firms.48 To the extent that such
changes occur, how will they affect the scope and quality of
compliance efforts within firms?
This Article examines the structural evolution of the firm counsel
position and considers the likely effects of continuing
professionalization. Based on focus groups and interviews with firm
counsel, as well as participant observation at meetings and
conferences for firm counsel, I compare the professional orientations
of part-time versus full-time firm counsel; and full-time firm counsel
appointed from inside versus outside the firm.
My comparative analysis is organized around three sets of
questions. First, who is the client? How do firm counsel define their
loyalties and with whom do they primarily interact? Partners?
Associates? Management? Staff? Do firm counsel clearly perceive
the firm (versus individual lawyers) as the client? To what extent do
firm counsel identify with other lawyers in the firm?
Second, what is the nature and extent of firm counsel's
authority? Do most firm counsel perceive themselves as having
authority over powerful partners? How do firm counsel measure
their authority and what do they identify as its sources? How do firm
counsel define the qualities needed to be effective in their role(s)?
Finally, how do firm counsel define their role in promoting
compliance with ethics rules and other professional regulation? Do
firm counsel view unethical conduct to be a serious issue within the
firm? What types of ethical and regulatory issues do firm counsel
consider to be the most serious or difficult to address?
The analysis builds on a 2002 article about the emergence of in-
house counsel in law firms49 and is intended as a follow-up to that
article. Part I describes my research methods and the characteristics
of firm counsel in the sample. Parts II through IV present the
findings on the three questions outlined above.
Overall, I find the professionalization of firm counsel to be a
positive development. Certainly firms' increasing investment in firm
counsel is a positive development. Most evidence suggests that law
48. See Jack Haas & William Shaffir, Ritual Evaluation of Competence: The Hidden
Curriculum of Professionalization in an Innovative Medical School Program, 9 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 131, 132 (1982) (defining professionalization as a process that involves
several dimensions, including "developing greater loyalty to colleagues than to clients").
49. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3 (examining the emergence of in-
house counsel in a sample of thirty-two law firms).
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firms invest too little in self-regulation" and that ethical controls in
large law firms tend to be "remarkably weak."' 51  Against this
backdrop, appointing a specialist to be responsible for compliance
represents an important step toward accountability by firm
management. 2 In the words of one observer: "[h]aving responsibility
with one individual is highly preferable to nobody being ultimately
responsible. 5
Moreover, although they tend to speak in terms of "risk" and
"risk management" rather than "ethics" and "compliance," most
professional firm counsel appear strongly committed to promoting
internal accountability and protecting the firm; and most perceive
themselves to be effective in this role. Full-time firm counsel who
''grew up" in their firms report that they are able to draw on their
personal history with firm members to maintain their credibility and
authority after they relinquish outside practice. Full-time firm
counsel appointed from outside the firm report other viable sources
of authority, such as membership in external networks made up of
insurers and other firm counsel. Although it is still early days for
outside appointments, and there are not many examples to study, so
far there is little evidence that outsiders necessarily lack authority
within the firm.
There does appear to be a trade-off between the outside
appointment of firm counsel and firm counsel's jurisdiction over
sensitive issues such as conflicts and client intake. Although long-
term partners who serve as firm counsel tend to have a proprietary
attitude toward the firm, which arguably compromises their
50. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 691, 696-702 (2002) (reviewing research on the prevalence and effectiveness of
ethical infrastructure in law firms); Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Bringing Legal Realism to
the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 697, 704-O5 (1998)
(summarizing the main findings of a study of legal ethics among large-firm litigators).
51. Marc C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 837, 858 (1998) (reporting on the results of
focus groups with large firm litigators). According to one associate in the study:
I've worked at two firms, and I think that in both firms, certainly, you would be
encouraged to bring anything that you felt was a clear problem to the right place-
although, quite frankly, I couldn't tell you what the right place was, in either of
those firms, because they didn't designate anyone in particular, to my knowledge.
Id. at 859.
52. See Chambliss, supra note 3, at 129-36 (arguing that the role of firm counsel
should be compared to realistic alternatives, rather than being compared to a nostalgic,
collegial ideal).
53. Thornton, supra note 36 (quoting Ward Bower).
[Vol. 841524
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independence as firm counsel, this proprietary attitude often goes
hand-in-hand with special access and personal authority on sensitive
and strategic issues. Firms that are able to fill the role of firm counsel
with a powerful insider appear to prefer to do so.
Firm counsel hired from outside, by contrast, tend to have a
broader but more legalistic mandate, verging on the administrative,
which in time could end up weakening the collective professional
authority of firm counsel. In Part V, I suggest some strategies for
promoting the authority of firm counsel and the vibrancy of their
external networks; and for improving collaboration between insurers,
academics, and firms.
I. RESEARCH METHODS AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
My analysis is based on an ongoing qualitative study of law firm
in-house counsel.54 The first stage of the study consisted of focus
groups55 and interviews56 with firm counsel in a nonrandom sample of
thirty-two law firms.57 This research was conducted between May
54. For an early description of the overall research agenda, see Chambliss & Wilkins,
supra note 50, at 702-16 (explaining the theoretical foundations of the study, the primary
research questions, and initial hypotheses). For a more recent statement focusing
specifically on the role of firm counsel, see Chambliss, supra note 3, at 138-41, 145-51
(discussing variables of interest).
55. We conducted three focus groups involving ten to fifteen participants each.
Participants included bar regulators, academics, and outside lawyers who specialize in
professional liability matters, as well as firm counsel and their functional equivalents in
twenty-nine law firms. Each focus group began with an informal dinner for participants,
followed the next day by two formal sessions lasting 90-120 minutes each. See Chambliss
& Wilkins, supra note 3, at 561 n.15 (describing the focus groups). As in the initial
analysis, I label the three focus groups A, B, and C, and refer to participants in each focus
group by a unique number (e.g., Al, A2, B1, etc). Id. Citations are provided for
previously published remarks.
56. We supplemented the focus group data with follow-up interviews with some
participants. The initial sample also includes three respondents who did not participate in
the focus groups, but whom I interviewed individually by telephone. These interviews
lasted thirty to sixty minutes each. Id. at 561 n.16. I refer to these interview-only subjects
as IA, IB, and IC, to distinguish them from the interview subjects in the second stage of
the study. See infra note 59. In the initial analysis, we referred to the three interview-only
subjects as I1, 12, and 13. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 561 n.16. Citations are
provided for previously published remarks.
57. The initial sample can best be described as a "snowball" (or "reputational")
sample, in which we asked a few bar leaders and ethics specialists known to us to
recommend participants for the study; then asked these participants for more names, and
so on; until we felt we had enough data to present interesting preliminary findings. Id. at
561-62 (describing the 2001 sample). See generally Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling,
32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT. 148 (1961) (explaining snowball sampling);
Charles Kadushin, Power, Influence and Social Circles: A New Methodology for Studying
Opinion Makers, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 685, 694-96 (1968) (discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of snowball sampling).
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2001 and March 2002.58 The second stage of the study consisted of
interviews with firm counsel at twelve additional law firms59 and
participant observation at meetings and conferences where panels of
firm counsel discussed their roles.' These interviews and
observations took place in 2005. Altogether, the combined sample
includes forty-eight firm counsel representing forty-seven firms.61
Appendix A reports the characteristics of respondents and firms in
the sample.
A. "Firm Counsel" as a Unit of Analysis
The first stage of the study focused on the emergence of a formal,
specialized position from what typically had been a committee or
informal assignment.62 We therefore defined our unit of analysis in
broad, functional terms, referring to respondents as "in-house
compliance specialists" regardless of their actual titles.63 Of the
thirty-two respondents in the initial sample, the most popular titles
were "firm counsel,". "general counsel," or "counsel to the firm" (ten
respondents), followed by "ethics partner," "ethics adviser," or
"professional responsibility advisor" (seven respondents). 64
As the role of law firm in-house counsel has expanded and begun
to be institutionalized within firms, I have begun to use the label
"firm counsel" to refer to my unit of analysis, in part to distinguish in-
house counsel in law firms from in-house counsel in corporations,65
and in part because the centrality of the compliance function has
turned out to be an important empirical question. However, my unit
of analysis has not changed. Of the forty-eight respondents in the
58. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 562.
59. These interviews were secured through a variety of methods. I knew most of the
respondents from previous research or personal contact at conferences; some I met
through email exchanges on the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers
("APRL") listserv. The interviews were conducted by telephone and lasted sixty to ninety
minutes. I also gathered some initial and follow-up information via email. I refer to the
2005 interview subjects with the letter I and a unique number (I1, 12, etc).
60. I observed two panels involving a total of seven firm counsel, three of whom I also
interviewed by telephone. For notation purposes, those three are treated as interview
subjects. I refer to the firm counsel whom I observed, but did not interview, with the letter
O and a unique number (01, 02, etc).
61. One of the focus group participants practiced in the same firm as one of the firm
counsel interviewed in 2005.
62. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 565-70, 578-80 (discussing the evolution
of the firm counsel position).
63. Id. at 563-70 (defining "in-house compliance specialist" as a unit of analysis).
64. Id. at 565-66 (reporting respondents' titles).
65. See generally Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34 (analyzing the scope of
the attorney-client privilege as applied to in-house counsel in law firms).
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combined sample, most go by the title "firm counsel," "general
counsel," or "counsel to the firm" (nineteen respondents), followed
by "ethics partner," "ethics adviser," or "professional responsibility
advisor" (ten respondents). The rest have a variety of titles, such as
"conflicts partner," "loss prevention partner," and "risk management
partner," and many have more than one title indicating an in-house
role (for instance, "loss prevention partner" and "chair, professional
responsibility committee").
As was the case in the initial sample, respondents' titles do not
reliably indicate the structure or function of their in-house role.66 For
instance, nineteen respondents have titles indicating that they are the
chair, co-chair, or a member of a committee, such as the ethics or
conflicts committee; for twelve respondents, this is their only title.
However, the fact someone is the chair of a committee (rather than,
say, "general counsel") does not necessarily mean that the person
devotes less time to in-house matters or focuses only on the named
function of the committee. Two respondents whose formal title is
"chair, ethics committee" are full-time in that role and handle a wide
variety of matters for the firm, including claims. Likewise, some
"general counsel" are part-time in that role and may not be
responsible for some aspects of ethics and regulatory compliance.67
That being said, a comparison of titles in the 2001-02 and 2005
samples suggests a move toward single titles with the word "counsel"
in them, such as "firm counsel," "general counsel," and "special
counsel," which is consistent with recent media and professional
usage.68 Nine of the sixteen respondents in the 2005 sample have
"counsel" in their title (56%) compared to ten of thirty-two
respondents in the 2001-02 sample (31%).69
B. The Structure of the Firm Counsel Position
Fifteen respondents in the combined sample are full-time firm
counsel, or 31%, the same percentage as in the initial sample.70
Among part-time firm counsel, eleven are compensated directly for
66. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 566-69 (examining the relationship
between title, structure, and function).
67. See, e.g., FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 9 (reporting that only 82% of "general
counsel" in Am Law 200 firms advise their firms on professional responsibility issues,
defined as "conflicts, client privilege, etc.").
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
69. See Appendix A.
70. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 573. This figure is consistent with that
reported in the 2005 survey of Am Law 200 firms. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3
(reporting that 32% of respondents were full-time general counsel).
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their in-house service (for instance, by billing the firm as a client) and
twenty-one are not.7' Thus, 34% of part-time firm counsel in the
combined sample are compensated directly, up from 24% in the
initial sample. 2
Only five respondents in the combined sample were appointed
from outside the firm: four full-time firm counsel and one part-time
firm counsel, up from one each in the initial sample. Moreover, in
one case, the person appointed had "grown up" in the firm, but left
for fifteen years to pursue an academic career. [lIB].73 In another
case, the person initially joined the firm as a partner, and shortly
thereafter was appointed as ethics partner on a part-time,
compensated basis. [A14]. Thus, although I coded both as
"outsiders," they are to some extent hybrids.
Obviously, five is a small sample from which to draw conclusions
(or even, perhaps, speculations). Thus, I offer my findings about
outside appointment with the utmost modesty. That being said, at the
time of this writing there appear to be few (if any) other outside
appointments in the population.74 As to this group, therefore, I
believe that my sample is, at least, highly representative.
C. Firm Characteristics
The firms in the sample range in size from thirty-five to 1,000-
plus lawyers and are headquartered in sixteen different cities. The
average size of firms in the combined sample is 532 lawyers, down
from 611 lawyers in the initial sample. The breakdown of firms by
size category is: 35-150 lawyers (eight firms); 151-250 lawyers (seven
firms); 251-500 lawyers (twelve firms); 501-999 lawyers (thirteen
firms); 1,000-plus lawyers (seven firms). Most firms are
headquartered on the East Coast (thirty-one firms) or in the Midwest
71. Information for one respondent is missing. See Appendix A.
72. We initially reported compensation data for twenty-nine respondents, excluding
one retired firm counsel, one associate being groomed as firm counsel, and one
respondent for whom compensation data are missing. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra
note 3, at 573 n.47. The figures reported here include the retired firm counsel and the
associate, neither of whom is (or was) compensated directly.
73. Id. at 582.
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that all fifty-three general counsel
who responded to a survey of Am Law 200 firms had been appointed from within the
firm).
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(eleven firms).75 The location of firms is similar to those in the initial
sample.76
D. The Effect of Size
To some extent, of course, the structure of the firm counsel
position depends on firm size, with larger firms investing more in the
position than smaller firms. Appendix B provides a list of
respondents by firm size and structure of position. The average size
of the firms in the sample with full-time firm counsel is 920 lawyers;
the average size of firms with part-time, compensated firm counsel is
525 lawyers; and the average size of firms with uncompensated firm
counsel is 368 lawyers. These figures are roughly comparable to those
of the initial sample.77
As we noted in our initial analysis, however, size is not the only
important determinant of firms' level of investment.78 When the in-
house position was in its infancy, and not yet institutionalized within
firms, firms' investment appeared to turn primarily on partners'
appetite for centralized management79 and perhaps the identity of the
firm's insurer.8" As one respondent in the initial sample observed,
"The decision as to how to deal with ethical issues in our firm is not
dictated by the quantum of the work." [B2].81  If anything, the
opposite is true. Several respondents who moved from part-time to
full-time positions reported that the work expanded rapidly to fill the
available time.' Said one respondent, "I don't know how they
managed without me!" [A9].83
75. The cities with more than one firm in the sample are New York City (twelve
firms), Boston (nine), Chicago (five), Philadelphia (four), Minneapolis (three),
Washington, D.C. (three), and St. Louis (two).
76. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 561 nn.17-18.
77. In the initial sample, the average size of firms with full-time firm counsel was 988
lawyers; the average size of firms with part-time, compensated firm counsel was 574
lawyers; and the average size of firms with uncompensated firm counsel was 404 lawyers.
In our initial analysis, we reported the average size of firms with uncompensated firm
counsel as "roughly 350 lawyers." See id. at 576. However, this figure excluded two firms
that I am including here, and thus is not directly comparable. See supra note 72.
78. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 570-77 (noting the limited importance
of organizational imperatives such as size).
79. Id. at 570-72 (emphasizing the importance of the firm's management philosophy).
80. Id. at 559--60, 590 (noting the role of ALAS in promoting the appointment of "loss
prevention counsel" within firms).
81. Id. at 577.
82. Id. at 576-77. As one respondent noted:
The thing I notice is, there's a lot more business now that we have made a resource
available .... [W]e used to have a system where two of us would spend about 500
hours a year on conflicts, and maybe a third of that time on other professional
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Moreover, as the position of firm counsel becomes increasingly
prevalent within firms, it is likely to become increasingly standardized
in its formal title and structure,84 as is already occurring, 8 such that
variation by firm size will diminish. A key premise of this Article is
that firms are coalescing around a full-time, general counsel model,
with increasing structural (and ideological?) separation from partners.
Indeed, movement towards this "professional" model appears almost
inevitable, given the evolution of the managing partner position86 and
the increasing bureaucratization of law firm management generally.'
responsibility matters. Now, in my new [full-time] position, I am astounded that I
can't get everything done in a day and I don't think there are a lot of different
issues than there used to be when we spent 1,000 hours on this. [All].
Id. at 577.
83. Id.
84. Research shows that organizations in the same institutional environment tend to
become increasingly structurally similar to each other over time. Sociologists refer to this
process as "institutional isomorphism." See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The
Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147, 147-49 (1983) (defining "institutional
isomorphism"). For a review of research on the diffusion of compliance structures within
organizations, see Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of
Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 479, 496-501 (1997). For an application of institutional
theory to the development of ethical infrastructure in law firms, see Chambliss, Entity
Regulation, supra note 34, at 56-65; Chambliss, supra note 3, at 138-41; Chambliss &
Wilkins, supra note 50, at 707-16.
85. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
86. As law firms have grown, law firm management generally has become more
professionalized, with an increasing division between practice and management roles.
Although some large law firms continue to be led by practicing partners, in most large
firms, being managing partner is recognized as a full-time job, if not the start of a new
career. See Mike France, Managing Partner: The Tender Trap, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at
Al ("[A]lmost all [large firms] have one full-time (or nearly full-time) leader who sets
strategy, speaks to the press and hires lateral partners."); James Jones & Carl Leonard,
The Price of Leadership: A New Look at Setting Compensation for Managing Partners,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2002, at 5 (noting that "in larger firms.., the managing partner's job is
usually a full-time position"). Some firms have begun to send their managing partners for
special training at elite business schools. See Leigh Jones, Training Leaders a Top Priority:
Merged Firms Bring New Challenges, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1 (describing law firm
management training programs at Harvard Business School, University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School of Business, and Northwestern University's Kellogg School of
Management).
87. Bureaucracies and professions are "distinct but nevertheless complementary
modes of work organization." LARSON, supra note 9, at 199. Both reflect a process of
"rationalization." See David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from
Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1837 n.293 (1989);
George Ritzer, Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationalization: The Views of
Max Weber, 53 SOC. FORCES 627, 632 (1975). Indeed, I could have titled this paper "The
Bureaucratization of Law Firm In-House Counsel," without altering the focus of the paper
very much. See Elizabeth Gorman, Explaining the Spread of Law Firm In-House Counsel
Positions: A Response to Professor Chambliss, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1577, 1579-82 (2006)
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Thus, firm size is less important to my analysis than it might first
appear. Although size clearly plays a role in defining firms'
institutional communities-that is, the firms they look to for
comparison and with which they compete-I posit that over time firm
size will begin to operate more like a categorical than a linear
variable, with most firms over a certain size having full-time general
counsel.88 As one law firm consultant predicts, "we expect to see
virtually all major [U.S.] firms with designated general counsel in the
near future."8 9 A British consultant makes a similar prediction for the
top London firms.90
My questions are how firms' increasing reliance on professional
firm counsel will affect the scope and substance of compliance efforts
within firms, and what limitations, if any, there are on the
development of firm counsel as an autonomous professional group.
The next Part begins to investigate these issues by examining how
firm counsel define "the firm" as a client, and what these orientations
reveal about their role(s) within firms.
II. WHO IS THE CLIENT?
The question "who is the client?" has both a legal and a
sociological component. As a legal inquiry, it is a question about firm
counsel's professional responsibilities under Model Rule 1.13
(Organization as Client),9" and the scope of the attorney-client
privilege for communication between firm counsel and other
members of the firm.' In the initial sample, there appeared to be
some confusion and internal division among respondents about the
professional responsibilities of firm counsel, including the identity of
the firm as the client.93 Early cases testing the scope of in-firm
privilege also indicated some confusion within law firms about the
(using this phrase). I focus on "professionalization" because I am interested in the
organization and power of firm counsel as a group, as well as in their individual and
collective role within firms.
88. See Gorman, supra note 87, at 1584 (noting that "[a]s firm counsel positions
become more legitimate and institutionalized, it may become the case that any firm that
wants to be seen as a serious player will have to have one").
89. Thornton, supra note 36 (quoting Ward Bower of Altman Weil).
90. Mullally, supra note 2 (quoting Olivia Burren of The St. Paul). According to
Burren, "Increasingly, City firms are appointing risk and compliance managers to take
away the work load from partners. I predict that in the next three to four years all of the
top fifty firms will have someone in that position." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (2003).
92. See generally Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34.
93. Id. at 1762 (reporting that our initial study "revealed several questions on this
front").
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professional responsibilities of partners who also act as firm counsel.94
Part II.A reports on my efforts to follow up on these issues.
As a sociological inquiry, "who is the client?" is a question about
firm counsels' loyalties and their day-to-day function in the firm. For
instance, whom do firm counsel serve and with whom do they
interact? Do firm counsel focus primarily on partners' concerns
about conflicts and intake? Or are they available to other groups
such as associates and staff? To what extent do firm counsel identify
professionally with partners? I address these questions in Part II.B.
I find that professionalization of firm counsel has contributed to
the clarification of firm counsels' legal and professional duties to the
firm. Indeed, to some extent, the professionalization of firm counsel
has been driven by the need for such clarification. Firms' interest in
preserving the privilege for communication with firm counsel has
contributed to the increasing formalization of the firm counsel
position and the increasing structural separation of firm counsel from
partners. These developments, in turn, have helped to highlight the
boundaries between the role of firm counsel and that of other lawyers
in the firm.
The price of this clarification, however, may be the increasing
detachment of firm counsel from the most sensitive ethical and
strategic issues within the firm. Firm counsel hired from outside, in
particular, appear to interact less with partners and more with central
management and administrative staff. They also may be more likely
than insiders to act primarily as technical advisors and leave
normative and strategic questions to management. Of course, with
only five outsiders in the sample, my findings on this point are highly
speculative. Moreover, some of the detachment that I observe may
simply be a byproduct of the expansion of the firm counsel position,
rather than some kind of cultural or ideological response on the part
of partners or firm counsel. Nevertheless, my findings are suggestive
and may have important implications for the future role of firm
counsel.
94. See United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the district
court's concerns on this point); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572, n.35 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (criticizing the firm for failing to distinguish between the lawyers acting as firm
counsel and the lawyers acting as clients); Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34, at
1732-33, 1750-51 (emphasizing the need to formally define firm counsel's role before the
communication at issue occurs).
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A. The Legal Inquiry
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct make it sound easy.
Who is the client? Answer: the firm. As Rule 1.13(a) states, "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. 9 5  In
practice, of course, as the experience of corporate counsel suggests,96
questions about the identity of the client are more difficult to resolve.
For instance, who speaks for the client? If there is conflict within the
management, whose instructions prevail?97  When is corporate
counsel acting as an attorney for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege, 9  rather than in some other capacity, such as a
businessperson? 99 In an internal investigation, when must corporate
counsel warn potentially cooperative witnesses-or wrongdoers-that
counsel represents the firm, rather than their individual interests (the
so-called "corporate Miranda")?"
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003).
96. See generally JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 3 (2005)
("Ethical Issues for Inside Counsel"). I focus on corporate counsel because that is the
group to whom firm counsel compare themselves. However, government lawyers face
many of the same problems, plus their own unique challenges. See, e.g., Steven K.
Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers
Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 797-802 (2000) (discussing the difficulties
of identifying the client of the government lawyer).
97. See, e.g., In re Davis, No. 96-0-04662, 2003 WL 21904732, at *4 (Cal. Bar Ct. Aug.
6, 2003) (disciplinary proceeding against corporate counsel who failed to obtain written
permission for continued representation after a dispute arose among the board). See
generally William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?
An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2003) (criticizing existing
approaches to this question).
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked ... with respect to ... (1) a
communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose
of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.").
99. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125
(RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (finding negotiation of
environmental provisions in a contract to be outside a lawyer's "traditional function");
Gen. Foods Corp. v. Jay V. Zimmerman Co., No. 86 Civ. 2697 (KLB), 1988 WL 5371, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1988) (denying the privilege where attorney was acting as a business
adviser); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE
§§ 3.21-.30 (2003) (summarizing the factors that courts consider in determining whether
in-house counsel was acting as a lawyer for the purpose of the privilege).
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (requiring the lawyer to
explain the identity of the client "when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer
is dealing"); Paul M. Koning, Legal Ethics for In-House Counsel: Selected Issues, 59 TEX.
B.J. 22, 23 (1996) (referring to this concept as the "corporate 'Miranda' "); Nancy J.
Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging from the Expanding
1534 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
Such questions are especially tricky for firm counsel for several
reasons. First, unlike corporate counsel, who are formally hired for
that position from outside the organization, most firm counsel emerge
from within the existing partnership and take on the role of "firm
counsel" in a gradual manner, as their titles reflect.1 1 Thus, as a
threshold matter, it may be difficult to determine when a partner is
acting as firm counsel, such that a lawyer-client relationship is
established, and when a partner is simply giving advice or instructions
as a colleague or supervisor. After all, in a law firm, most people
getting and giving advice are lawyers. What distinguishes the lawyer-
client relationship from ordinary collegial communication?" °
Law firms also tend to be less hierarchical than corporations,13
and lawyers tend to be less observant of the formal hierarchies that
do exist.1" Powerful partners may be able to circumvent formal
management controls, 05 and even partners who cooperate with
management tend to retain significant autonomy in their day-to-day
work.106 Thus, unlike corporate counsel, who typically answer to the
Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 497, 503 (1998) (noting that the nature
and scope the required warning "is not always clear").
101. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 565-69 (examining the emergence of
the firm counsel position and reporting a weak relationship between title and function).
102. Courts were initially reluctant to recognize the attorney-client privilege for
communication between firm counsel and other members of the firm, noting that such a
privilege potentially would cover every communication in a law firm. See United States v.
Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the district court's concerns on this
point); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (criticizing the firm for
failing to distinguish between the lawyers acting as firm counsel and the lawyers acting as
clients); Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34, at 1728-33 (discussing the initial
cases on in-firm privilege).
103. See NELSON, supra note 41, at 207-14 (discussing the relative lack of rules and
formal hierarchy in law firms). As one respondent put it, "Law firms are more fluid,
traditional, murky, than corporations where there are rules of governance." [I1].
104. Witness the hackneyed comparison of law firm management to "herding cats."
See, e.g., Holly English, Values at Work: How Strong Core Values Can Make Your Firm
More Successful, N.J. L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at 207 (using this phrase); Richard Gary, So You
Think You Want to be Chair; 10 Questions to Ask Yourself-And the Firm-Before You
Make the Leap into Firm Management, LAW FIRM INC., Jan. 13, 2005, at 23, 25
(characterizing this phrase as demeaning to lawyers, "albeit in a good natured way"). A
LEXIS search of this phrase yields sixty-three hits from American Lawyer Media alone.
105. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm
Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 715 (1997) (finding that "in some firms, powerful
partners routinely bypass work assignment systems and directly recruit the associates with
whom they want to work ('poaching')").
106. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An
Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271,
284-85 (1996) (reporting the results of a study of peer review procedures in 191 law firms);
Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics: Beyond the Rules-Questions and Possible Responses, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 878-79 (1998) (discussing the lack of "horizontal monitoring"
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chief executive officer or some other individual in a well-defined
vertical hierarchy,1°7 firm counsel potentially answer to every partner
in the firm. As one respondent put it, "you've got 150 clients right
there in the building ...." [C2]. 18  According to Edward Zulkey,
general counsel at Baker & McKenzie since 1994, "every partner
believes that I answer to them. In that way, the constituency that I
serve is far broader [than in a corporation]." 0 9
Finally, in many firms, the role of firm counsel grew out of a
proprietary, pastoral role, in which a trusted partner made himself
available to answer sensitive questions on a sometimes confidential
basis. The partners who did this were able to balance their sense of
responsibility to the individual lawyer with their sense of
responsibility to the firm without appealing to the formal rules
governing lawyer-client relationships. As one partner and part-time
firm counsel put it, "these are my guys."' 10  The vestiges of this
informal role, and the confidence that it is possible to mediate
between the interests of individual lawyers and those of the firm,
provide a powerful alternative model to that specified by Rule 1.13.
These issues tend to be the most difficult during the early
development of the firm counsel position, such as just after the
position is formalized; or where the partner who serves as firm
counsel does so on a volunteer basis (and therefore does not
specifically record or bill time the spent on in-house matters)."' 1 For
instance, the following statement comes from a partner who had just
taken on the role of full-time general counsel in her 100-lawyer firm:
among partners); Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and
Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 825
(1998) (quoting a partner who said "[o]ne doesn't monitor one's partners").
107. See ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, ACCA CENSUS OF U.S. IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL 7-8 (2001) (reporting that roughly 60% of general counsel report to the chief
executive officer of the corporation, and about 30% report to the president or another
executive); see also EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS
AT WORK 74-75 (1986) (discussing the internal structure of most corporate law
departments, whereby staff counsel answer to the general counsel in a kind of "benevolent
dictatorship").
108. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 586.
109. Flahardy et al., supra note 4, at 50 (quoting Zulkey) (alteration in original).
110. Remarks from the floor of a conference. The partner who made this remark was
defending his practice of promising confidentiality to individual lawyers in his capacity as
firm counsel despite the potential tension between this promise and the duties imposed by
the Model Rules. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
111. See Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34, at 1749 (arguing that direct
compensation "is the clearest way to demarcate the role of firm counsel").
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Somebody comes in and reports to you; do you document or do
you not? I mean, do you use e-mail? I hate e-mail. I don't
want anything on the system .... Do you give-do you have a
little sign that says, I'm the firm's lawyer, not yours? ... If I get
a sexual harassment complaint ... what role am I doing? I
think there are a lot of questions .... [A13].112
We heard similar comments from volunteer firm counsel in the
initial sample, including this comment from the ethics advisor at a
250-lawyer firm:
I have had discussions with partners ... who have told me that
my duty is to them and not to the firm .... I am sure the vast
majority would say that my duty is clearly to the partnership [as
a whole] .... I usually can sort out that problem, but ... I
struggle with that issue. [B5].
In fact, several volunteers in the initial sample did not view
themselves as being ina lawyer-client relationship with the firm. For
instance, two volunteers said they encourage lawyers to speak to
them "in confidence" if questions or problems arise. As one conflicts
partner, who also is the chair of his firm's professional responsibility
committee, explained:
They don't come to the entity, they come to someone on the
committee. They are assured that they can do it in confidence,
and that they not only have a right to do it, they have the duty
to do it. [B3].
Another example comes from the chair of the ethics committee
at a 150-lawyer firm:
I can think of two specific instances where [associates have
come to me in confidence]. One was an associate who ... was
concerned about whether or not she had, in effect, been
requested to inflate billings .... I told her that I would not
disclose her identity .... [Cl].
As a strategy for encouraging internal reporting, the promise of
confidentiality is appealing. Most respondents agreed that getting
lawyers to come forward with questions and problems is one of the
most challenging aspects of their job,113 and on the most sensitive
issues, assuring confidentiality may be the only way to get lawyers in
112. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 590-91.
113. Id. at 587 (quoting several focus group participants on this point).
1536 [Vol. 84
LAW FIRM IN-HO USE CO UNSEL
the door." 4 Yet promising confidentiality to individual lawyers, or
allowing lawyers to be confused on this point, would be incompatible
with the role of firm counsel. Firm counsel have an obligation under
Rule 1.13(b) to report certain types of misconduct to law firm
management."5 Firm counsel also have a duty to report certain types
of misconduct to disciplinary authorities n 6 and clients. n 7  If the
interests of the reporting lawyer are adverse to the firm, Rule 1.13(f)
requires firm counsel to clarify that the firm is the client."8
Some firms have attempted to resolve this problem by creating a
separate in-house position for the specific purpose of receiving
confidential reports. This position, typically titled "ombudsman," is
designed primarily for associates, who may be nervous about
exposing their ignorance or questioning their superiors' conduct.
Leaving aside the obvious question about whether this type of
resource is effective-it may be that even ombudsmen do not seem
trustworthy in some contexts-there also is a question as to whether
ombudsmen actually solve the problem of confidential reporting.
Although ombudsmen, by definition, do not represent the law firm,
they still have an obligation as lawyers to report some types of lawyer
misconduct under Rule 8.3.119 Thus, unless the ombudsman can be
said to represent the reporting lawyer, and thus owe that lawyer a
114. For example, studies show that confidentiality is important in encouraging
employees to report sexual harassment. In a 1995 survey of federal employees, 19% of
harassed employees who did not report the harassment indicated that the lack of
confidentiality played a role in their decision not to report. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT.
BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS AND
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 35 (1995), available at http://www.mspb.gov/studies/sex
har.pdf. In another survey of women in management, over 80% of those surveyed
indicated that an assurance of confidentiality would encourage employees to report sexual
harassment. See Shirley Feldman-Summers, Analyzing Anti-Harassment Policies and
Complaint Procedures: Do They Encourage Victims To Come Forward?, 16 LAB. LAW.
307, 309-16 (2000).
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003) (requiring lawyers to
report misconduct that is "likely to result in substantial injury to the organization ... to a
higher authority in the organization").
116. See id. R. 8.3(a) (stating that "[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority").
117. See id. R. 1.4(a)(1) (stating that "a lawyer must promptly inform the client of any
decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent.. . is required
by these Rules); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20
cmt. c (2000) (stating that "[i]f the lawyer's conduct of the matter gives the client a
substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer, the lawyer must disclose that to the
client").
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2003).
119. See id. R. 8.3(a).
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duty of confidentiality, 2 ° the creation of an ombudsman merely
reproduces the original tension in a new guise.
Several volunteers in the initial sample also said that they
routinely represent individual firm members accused of misconduct.
One volunteer described his practice in representing firm members as
follows:
I get involved in [claims] for purposes of determining the extent
to which we need to have that lawyer represented at the
deposition, with pretty much a policy that I will attend that
deposition with the lawyer. On the occasion that we think
something is brewing, I may hire outside counsel. That doesn't
happen too often .... If there is a [disciplinary] complaint, the
bar asks for a response, I am, invariably, involved in that
activity. [C2].
Another example comes from the ethics committee chair quoted
above:
We have had occasion where there's been disciplinary charges
filed against someone. Those come to me ....
Q. When you say it comes to you, do you actually represent the
person in the proceeding?
A. Yes.
Q. How about malpractice claims?
A.... [They] come to me. [Cl].
Such comments prompted lively debates in two of the three focus
groups, with some respondents defending the practice of representing
firm members and others expressing strong reservations about it. As
one part-time general counsel from a 1,200-lawyer firm put it, "I
would not dream of representing one of my partners in a disciplinary
proceeding." [A10].
What was interesting about these debates, however, was not
respondents' differences of opinion about whether, if ever, to self-
represent. This is a complex and interesting issue, deserving of a
separate paper.12 1 What was interesting was that some volunteers
120. See id. R. 8.3(c) (stating "[t]his Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 [defining the lawyer's duty of confidentiality]").
121. Respondents in the 2005 sample also were split on this issue, with some routinely
getting involved and others feeling strongly that such involvement is inherently
problematic. As one respondent put it, "the self-representation issue is all over the
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obviously had not given much thought to the potential for a conflict
of interest between the individual and the firm. One volunteer said,
in explaining his practice of assisting in firm members' defense, "[w]e
are not holding ourselves out as lawyers to individual lawyers in the
firm, or maybe even to the firm. We are the people with
responsibility within our firms to resolve problems .... We're trying
to deal with problems as a business organization. [We] are not
necessarily functioning as lawyers." [C2].
Respondents who are formally appointed and paid to act as firm
counsel not surprisingly tend to be much clearer about their role as
firm counsel and their duties to the firm as a client. Most
"professional" firm counsel in the sample were quick to compare the
role of firm counsel to that of corporate counsel and displayed ready
familiarity with the requirements of Rule 1.13. As to confidential
reporting, for instance, one full-time firm counsel said:
I have not run into a situation where I felt that [confidentiality]
was a problem. I can imagine it being a problem if somebody
has-if there has been malfeasance of some kind and they want
to tell you about that.... You would be in the same situation
as an in-house counsel where you have to say at some point,
"maybe you need to get your own lawyer and avoid this
conversation." [Al].
Consider also the following comment from a paid, part-time firm
counsel:
board." [15]. One factor that affects respondents' practices is their liability coverage.
Some insurers allow firms to self-represent with the carrier's permission, whereas others
do not. Some policies allow time spent on self-defense to be billed against the firm's
deductible, which is also a consideration for firms. Several respondents referred to the
terms of their coverage in explaining their position on this issue. As one respondent said:
"We routinely respond to disciplinary inquiries. We often defend ourselves on
malpractice claims, within our self-insured retention and with the consent of our carrier.
In such cases, the individual lawyers may or may not have their own counsel." [161.
Another important factor is the practice background of firm counsel. Said one
respondent: "I can think of a very large national firm where the risk manager is a very
good trial lawyer and where the insurer lets the firm self-represent and he does it. If the
general counsel had been a securities lawyer, they wouldn't touch it." [15]. Finally, some
respondents argue that there is rarely a conflict between the interests of the individual and
the firm. According to one respondent, who represents his firm in "80 percent of our
claims":
Even if [a claim] has merit, there's no conflict. Certainly the joint representation
issue is present but for the most part, the individual's interest and the firm's
interest are identical in defeating the claim. I have yet to see any fallout in the firm
from someone being sued for malpractice. Being fired or losing compensation.
[13].
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As counsel to the firm, I have a conflict of interest with my
clients sometimes.... The partners and associates in the law
firm, just as the officers and employees of a corporation, often
have conflicts of interest with the entity and I must be very
careful of that. [A10].
Respondents also appear to have become more sensitive to their
duties over time, with a marked difference between respondents in
the initial and subsequent samples. In the 2005 sample, even
volunteers identify the firm as the client and are clear about what that
entails. The following comment comes from a volunteer in a 700-
lawyer firm:
When receiving confidential reports, firm counsel must explain
that he or she is the firm's lawyer. Confidentiality will be
maintained to the extent possible, but any disclosure necessary
will be made to firm management. [16].
Or, as one paid, part-time firm counsel explained:
In most imaginable situations firm counsel will have a duty to
report to the managing partner, or the managing partner and/or
the management committee. If the reported misconduct raises
the prospect of a potential claim against the firm, firm counsel
may be required to notify the firm's ... carrier. If the
report casts reasonable doubt on the honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness of the member, firm counsel may need to report
under Rule 8.3 .... If the misconduct involves legal
malpractice, the firm owes a duty to report its own malpractice
to the client. [13].
One might suspect that the difference between samples results
from imprecise sampling and that some volunteers in the initial
sample should not be included in an analysis of "firm counsel."
Obviously, it is a bit tautological to state that lawyers who view
themselves as firm counsel are more likely to be aware of their duties
as firm counsel. There are, however, at least two reasons to believe
that the difference reflects changes in the population of interest; that
is, in the professional identities and sensitivities of the lawyers
themselves.
First, during the three years between samples, there were three
published cases addressing the scope of the attorney-client privilege
for communication between firm counsel and other members of the
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firm.122 These cases were discussed in law reviews123 and the legal
press'2 4 and prompted a formal ethics opinion by the New York State
Bar Association. 25 The respondents in the 2005 sample were keenly
aware of these opinions and the issue of privilege more generally.
Several respondents mentioned that privilege considerations affect
their work habits, and one respondent expressly reported that things
had changed over the past several years. The following comment
comes from the assistant general counsel in a large East Coast firm:
I don't remember [the previous general counsel] thinking about
it. When I did time sheets I put down everyone I talked to and
what I talked about. But [the new general counsel] doesn't
want those things to be discoverable. So now I just say "ethics
and conflicts issues." Which makes filling out my time sheets
much easier. Also, sometimes I'll be talking to someone about
a lawyer in another office doing something they shouldn't be
and there will be all this email back and forth and at some point
I say, "would someone please pick up the phone and call me
and stop all this email traffic?" [Ill].
In addition to raising awareness about the potential
discoverability of in-firm communication, the privilege cases also
raised firms' awareness of the need to formally define the firm
counsel position. Some consultants attribute firms' efforts to
establish the structural independence of the position to concerns
122. See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283,
287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that "a law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client
privilege against a current client when performing a conflict check in furtherance of
representing that client"); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that as long as
the firm continued to represent the client, the firm could not maintain any privilege
against the client); VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 111 P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005) (stating that applicability of the attorney-client privilege to in-firm communications
"must be determined on a case-by-case basis").
123. See generally William T. Barker, Law Firm In-House Attorney-Client Privilege
Vis-d-Vis Current Clients, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 467 (2003) (criticizing the denial of privilege
in Bank Brussels and Koen Book); Chambliss, In-Firm Privilege, supra note 34 (suggesting
a framework for analyzing the scope of in-firm privilege); Douglas R. Richmond, Law
Firm Internal Investigations: Principles and Perils, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2004)
(discussing the implications of the cases for law firm internal investigations).
124. See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis, Professional Responsibility: Multijurisdictional
Practice, Internal Discussions, Counsel's Advice, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 3 (criticizing
Koen Book).
125. NYSBA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 789 (2005) (stating that, "[i]n
considering its obligations to its clients, a law firm may consult with one or more lawyers
in the Firm" in confidence without creating an impermissible conflict of interest with the
client).
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about preserving the privilege for communication with firm
counsel. 26 Thus, concerns about the privilege undoubtedly have
contributed to the "professionalization" of firm counsel, including an
increased sensitivity to the formal responsibilities of that role.
The second reason to believe that firm counsel have become
more sensitive to their professional duties is that they are interacting
more with each other as a specialized professional group 127 and such
interactions tend to promote the development of shared professional
norms."2 The debates among focus group participants about the issue
of self-representation are one example of this.129  Participants who
had not previously considered the potential for conflicts of interest
presumably left the focus group with more awareness about the issue.
On other issues, focus group participants were explicit about the
benefits of exchangel 3°-indeed, this was part of our motivation for
organizing focus groups in the first place.'
Thus, the professionalization of firm counsel is both the cause
and consequence of heightened sensitivity to the rules governing in-
house counsel and the identity of the firm as a client. As firms'
reliance on firm counsel has grown and firm counsel have become
more specialized, the role of firm counsel has become more defined
and distinct from that of other lawyers in the firm. Part II.B examines
the consequences of this increasing distinction for firm counsels'
professional orientation and their day-to-day role within firms.
B. The Sociological Inquiry
Most respondents focus primarily on managing conflicts of
interest and related issues such as client intake and lateral hiring.
Indeed, in many firms, the position of firm counsel emerged initially
as a response to the risks and inefficiencies associated with the
126. See Thornton, supra note 36 (quoting Ward Bower about firms' concerns about
privilege).
127. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (describing the advent of
roundtables and conferences for firm counsel).
128. See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 84, at 498-501 (reviewing research on the
role of professional networks in spreading ideas and information among organizations).
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
130. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 577 (reporting an exchange among
participants in the first focus group about the scope of compliance efforts within firms).
As one participant said, "[A14] said about ten things that I know I ought to be doing and I
don't." [A3]. Id.
131. See id. at 589-91 (noting the potential importance of specialist networks among
firm in-house counsel); Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 50, at 711-12 (same).
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decentralized management of conflicts of interest.32  As one
respondent observed:
[My position] evolved as malpractice problems in large and
smaller firms became much more acute and conflicts in
particular became an extremely important part of those
proceedings. We saw that we institutionally needed to have a
tight ship. We do all the conflicts clearance out of [the main
office location].... [A71. 3
Another respondent's full-time position was created in
anticipation of a merger:
When we went through the combination ... [w]e sat down and
said well, we have [hundreds of] lawyers in [other jurisdictions]
... all doing conflicts differently .... At that point, a whole lot
of people got different jobs because this is going to be
centralized, there weren't going to be cowboys, there couldn't
be cowboys .... No more clearing your own conflicts. It was a
huge jerk for most people .... We knew that conflicts was
going to be the largest issue ... and if we didn't get it right it
was going to be a big, big problem. [A8]. 134
While the preceding examples come from respondents in the
initial sample, nearly all the respondents in both samples report that
conflicts dominate their agenda. Said one volunteer, "I've never
broken it out, but certainly new business questions are the single
biggest area of concern...." [181. One respondent reports that
"seventy to eighty percent of my time is spent on conflicts." [Ill].
Another respondent from the 2005 sample gave the following
summary:
The overwhelming number of questions are about conflicts ....
What counts as direct adversity under 1.7? What counts as
substantially related under 1.9 .... Questions about whether a
screen can be erected and whether it will be effective. Whether
certain conflicts are consentable. What I call "hot potato"
issues: can we solve this by dropping client A to get client B?
Thrust upon conflicts .... It's a hard area. [I5].
Given respondents' near unanimity about the centrality of
conflicts, the interesting question-at least as we framed it in the
132. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 566-69 (providing examples).
133. Id. at 569 (second alteration in original).
134. Id. (alterations in original).
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initial analysis-is to what extent respondents focus on issues other
than conflicts.'35 In the initial analysis, we focused primarily on other
ethical issues; that is, "issues under the rules of professional
responsibility." [B9]. 136 We were not very specific, however. We
classified respondents' "substantive jurisdictions" on a crude
spectrum from "conflicts" to "broader"'37 and classified their
orientation to their in-house role as "reactive" or "proactive.' 1 38 We
found that the primary variable affecting respondents' positions on
these spectrums was the structure of compensation. 139 Partners who
were not compensated directly for their in-house service tended to
"focus primarily on answering [conflicts] questions and ... to be
protective of their time,"'140 whereas partners who were compensated
directly tended to "play a much broader and more proactive role in
their firms."'' Based on this finding, we concluded that "firms get
what they pay for,"'42 and urged firms to invest directly in the firm
counsel position.14 3
This Section follows up on that analysis from a slightly different
angle, by asking what groups are served by firm counsel and with
whom firm counsel identify. Specifically, to what extent do
respondents serve as a resource for associates and staff, in addition to
partners? To what extent do respondents identify professionally with
partners? And to what extent do the answers to these questions
depend on the structure of compensation and whether firm counsel
come from inside or outside the firm?
For the most part, my findings are consistent with those of our
initial analysis. In general, compensated firm counsel tend to play a
broader and more proactive role than uncompensated firm counsel,
and to address a wider range of issues and constituencies within the
firm. As in the initial sample, respondents in full-time positions are
especially likely to perform other functions in addition to managing
conflicts, and to serve as a resource for other constituencies, in
addition to partners. In some of the larger firms, full-time firm
135. Id. at 573.
136. Id. at 573-74 (quoting a focus group participant about his substantive jurisdiction
in the firm).
137. Id. at 567.
138. Id. at 574 (quoting one volunteer who described his in-house service as a "terrible
burden" and characterized the 500 hours per year he typically spends on the function as
"almost all reactive time").
139. Id. at 573 (identifying compensation as the key variable).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 574.
142. Id. at 577.
143. Id. at 580.
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counsel may even have a staff to assist them in routine conflicts
matters, thus freeing up some of firm counsel's time for other tasks.
For instance, one full-time general counsel at a 950-lawyer firm
has a "chief of staff ... [who does] the traffic cop work on client
intake. He happens to be a lawyer but he isn't functioning as a
lawyer; he functions as an administrator in the firm." The respondent
estimates that he himself spends about 40% of his time on conflicts
and intake, including strategic questions about the areas of practice
that "we want to get into." The rest of his time is spent on claims and
answering lawyers' questions, "[q]uestions that at the beginning of the
day I have no reason to anticipate .... A lot of them lately have been
on audit letter responses." [I10].
Another respondent is a full-time assistant to the part-time
general counsel of the firm:
Q. How do you divide up the job?
A. He does the insurance coverage ... and handles hiring
outside counsel for malpractice issues, and answers questions,
whatever. I field people's questions, too, and do engagement
letters, conflicts.
Q. How do the questions break down? Is it a matter of what
office the people are in, or your availability... ?
A. It's availability. He practices, so he is not always [available].
A lot of times people send us both a question-it's kind of a
work in progress, actually. I don't know if this is the most
efficient way to do it. Most of the time, people have
emergencies and are freaking out and want an answer right
away. [Ill].
These examples suggest that increasing investment in the firm
counsel position (or positions) will bring increased attention to the
compliance function, for instance by making firm counsel more
available to answer questions on a day-to-day basis. Respondents in
both samples stressed the importance of being readily available.1"
The general counsel quoted above said that he makes himself
"psychotically available" as a matter of policy. As he explained it:
You've got to get a sense of what people are up to, and
insinuate yourself as much as possible in the daily transactions
of the firm. I make sure to be as responsive to emails and
144. See id. at 586 (quoting several respondents from the initial sample on this point).
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phone calls as I would be to any demanding client. It is a
twenty-four hour job. I wake up dealing with Asia at night and
go to bed dealing with Asia in the morning. [110].
Yet while the availability of firm counsel to answer questions is
an obvious good, my findings also reveal some potential trade-offs of
the professional, full-time model-especially when the full-time firm
counsel is appointed from outside the firm. First, it appears that staff,
rather than associates, are the primary beneficiaries of firms'
increasing investment in the firm counsel position. Although several
full-time respondents mentioned dealing with associates "in
orientation" [112] or "when they come in in the fall" [A8], most full-
time respondents have very little day-to-day interaction with
associates. As one full-time general counsel reports, "I have some
interaction with associates but it is a bit of a vacuum. I work a lot
with partners, senior partners, and they are more likely to call. It's
not discouraged, but the first rule for associates usually is to ask the
partner." [112]. A few respondents were even a bit dismissive of
associates' concerns. As one respondent said:
Associates can be naive. You get a breathless phone call, "the
partner is asking me to back date documents!" And it turns out
this is a closed corporation, five guys who have been working
together for months, it's a start up, and now they need a current
board ratification of prior decisions, perfectly legal. No one is
defrauding anyone. [I1].
On the other hand, several full-time respondents report that they
have significant dealings with non-lawyer managers and
administrative staff. Firm counsel appointed from outside, in
particular, appear to work closely with non-lawyer managers and
administrators within the firm. One full-time firm counsel, who is not
a partner, and was appointed from outside the firm, reports directly
to the Chief Operations Officer ("COO") "on my administrative
duties," and to the management committee on "the legal side." The
COO is not a partner but "was hired from industry." [I1]. Another
full-time firm counsel, who is not a partner, and was brought in from
outside the firm, describes his day-to-day work as follows:
It's a combination of office advisory-that's a euphemism for
whatever crap comes across your desk-certain long-term
projects, certain short-term projects. One thing that is
significant, being full-time, is the amount of time I work with
senior administrators rather than with lawyers. I feel like-I
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was at a meeting and looked around the table and thought,
"here is my team, these are my guys." The people in the
financial department, the benefits department, the personnel
department. To a good extent, they are my clients, too, and
they were the most neglected areas before I came. Vendor
contracts-I review them. They were not reviewed before.
Same with the HR [human resource] people, now they have
someone to consult, hopefully prospectively, on compliance,
individual contracts. Same thing with marketing, making sure
we review marketing materials, review our website. [112].
In reporting these comments, I do not mean to suggest that
administrative issues are unimportant or less deserving of firm
counsels' time than questions from lawyers. As others have noted,
law firms traditionally have been relatively poorly managed,145 and
there are undoubtedly many aspects of firms' business that need
attention. It is noteworthy, however, that these particular respondents
have significant administrative duties, because as full-time, non-
partner counsel, who were appointed from outside the firm, they
represent the new breed of "professional" firm counsel. As noted
above, the first wave of firm counsel-those part-time, volunteer
ethics advisers who did not always follow Rule 1.13-referred to the
lawyers in the firm as "my guys." By comparison, one respondent
quoted above refers to the senior administrators as "my guys." What
does this imply for the future role of in-house counsel in law firms?
Further evidence of a possible shift in the jurisdiction of
professional firm counsel is that several full-time respondents in the
2005 sample report that they are not primarily responsible for
answering questions about ethics. For instance, the full-time firm
counsel with the chief of staff describes his jurisdiction as follows: "I
am the person who gets all the claims. I am not THE person who gets
all the ethics questions .... Those go to the head of our ethics
committee." [110]. The respondent who views the senior
administrators in the firm as his guys likewise reports that he is not
"exclusively" responsible for "conflicts and ethics":
Q. Was there a general counsel in the firm before you [were
brought in from outside]?
145. See NELSON, supra note 41, at 77-80, 205-28 (discussing lawyers' ideological
resistance to centralized management); Susan S. Samuelson, Strategic Planning, in LAW
FIRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINEss APPROACH ch. 1, § 1.7, at 57 (Susan S. Samuelson ed.,
1994) (same).
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A. No, but the big issues were all being handled somehow. So,
how were they going to feel about someone coming in and
taking their stuff away? Some were delighted. Some said they
were, but they aren't. They like being indispensable, it gives
them an entre to senior partners in the firm and they don't want
to let it go. I try to be diplomatic and work with them. They do
have institutional knowledge.... [I]t's like any other client. I
try to work with them. In some areas, I didn't take things over.
Conflicts and ethics-the firm already had a well-functioning
conflicts and ethics group, lawyers who knew those issues better
than I. [112].
One must be careful, obviously, about generalizing from these
few examples. Even in my small sample, the role of firm counsel
varies significantly from firm to firm, both within and across the
structural categories that I have defined. Thus, I do not mean to
argue that professional firm counsel ignore associates and do not care
about ethics-or even that the few respondents quoted above do
either of those things. On the contrary, as I report in Part IV, most
respondents in the sample appear to be dedicated and conscientious
lawyers who are professionally committed to promoting
accountability and compliance within firms.
Nevertheless, my findings suggesting a shift in the substantive
jurisdiction of firm counsel are consistent with the findings of the
2005 survey of general counsel in Am Law 200 firms. That survey
found that the percentage of respondents who advise their firms on
employment law and real estate matters had increased since 2004,146
while the percentage who advise their firms on professional
responsibility and ethics had declined.147 A shift in jurisdiction also
would be consistent with the increasing formal distinction between
firm counsel and partners.
One question is whether the shift I observe is a necessary or
permanent feature of the "professional" model. Although most large
law firms rely to some extent on professional and non-lawyer
managers, 14 firms have resisted appointing professional managers for
146. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 8 (reporting that 65% of general counsel
advise their firms on employment law, up from 53% in 2004, and that 24% advise their
firms on "leases and.., real estate issues," up from 18% in 2004).
147. Id. at 9-10 (reporting that 82% of respondents advise their firms on professional
responsibility issues, down from 88% in 2004, and 63% conduct in-house ethics education,
down from 68%).
148. See Susan M. Carrochi, Tired of Reinventing the Wheel? Consider Joining Local
ALA Chapter, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 27, 1997, at 3, available at LexisNexis
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key posts, such as managing partner.149 The conventional wisdom is
that "lawyers want to be managed by a lawyer"'s 0 -meaning lawyers
actively engaged in private practice (or not long removed). Having
an outside practice may be especially important for firm counsel,
insofar as they advise the firm on sensitive issues such as conflicts and
intake. As one respondent put it, "[i]n a way, it is easier to run a law
firm. We can function quite well if eighty to ninety percent of people
don't trust [the managing partner]. But I wonder what we would do if
the general counsel weren't accepted." [110].
At the same time, it is mistake to assume that professional firm
counsel face the same resistance to their authority as non-lawyer
managers. After all, full-time firm counsel are lawyers, and most are
not long removed from private practice. Moreover, as I argue in the
next Part, building a practice inside a law firm may not be so different
from building a practice based on outside clients. Thus, rather than
viewing firm counsels' authority as being structurally determined-
first by their "in-house" position, and then by whether they hold that
position full-time-I argue that the role of firm counsel should be
viewed as a market niche, with a tendency to expand over time.
III. THE NATURE OF FIRM COUNSELS' AUTHORITY
Most part-time firm counsel in the sample were skeptical that
full-time firm counsel would be respected by partners. As one
respondent put it, "They're not down in the trenches and that's what
some lawyers are always talking about: 'I'm in the trenches and
you're not.' So I think there is some benefit to ... having an active
practice." [C2]111 Part-time firm counsel report that having an
outside practice is especially important for their authority in decisions
Academic (discussing the formation and early history of the Association of Legal
Administrators, an international organization with 8,000 members in 1997); Richard R.
Hellstern, What is the Future Role of Non-Lawyer Executives; Letting Lawyers Concentrate
on Law, Leaving Administration to a Pro, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 15, 1996, at 54,
available at Lexis Nexis Academic (discussing the "churning" of legal administrators as
firms experiment with different forms of management); Tom Schoenberg, Getting Down
to Business, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at S56 (discussing Howrey & Simon's use of
non-lawyer managers).
149. See Schoenberg, supra note 148, at S56 (stating that "it is unlikely that a non-
lawyer will become a managing partner of a firm anytime soon"). In fact, the Model Rules
currently forbid non-lawyer ownership and executive management of law firms. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2003) ("Professional Independence of a
Lawyer").
150. Schoenberg, supra note 148, at S56 (quoting Michael Nannes, deputy managing
partner of D.C.'s Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky).
151. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 581.
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about business intake. The following comment comes from part-time
firm counsel at a 550-lawyer firm:
I think that the reason that the counseling is done by
individuals who really are functioning, practicing lawyers-I'm
a litigation partner, I have a litigation practice-is that we feel
that people who are actively engaged in practice can bring
experience to bear that's important to take into consideration
in resolving many of these issues. I also think that decisions, or
the advice we give-I have no idea how much I cost the firm in
the course of a year by telling them we can't take on matters-I
think the judgment is accepted more readily because it is
coming from somebody who is an active partner in the firm.
[B2] .152
Respondents also stressed the importance of tenure in the firm
and personal ties with firm leaders. The following comment comes
from a part-time firm counsel at a 175-lawyer firm:
I have never had a situation in a conflict situation where
someone has done an end run around me, or been able to undo
what I have done. I have a very strong relationship with the
managing partner and the people on the management
committee. They have all been here more than fifteen years
and I have been here more than twenty years. I think that is
very helpful in the general counsel role. [13].
Such comments suggest that "professional" firm counsel-that is,
full-time firm counsel and those appointed from outside the firm-
ultimately may not be effective in the firm counsel role. Some
commentators expressed similar views in the legal press following
Shutkin's appointment as general counsel at Shearman & Sterling.
One consultant noted that long-term partners "know the firm's
history, culture, clients and what its objectives are. 1 53 Another said
that firm counsel from outside "often do not sit at board or
partnership level ... [and] do not have the power to make things
happen. '154
152. Id.
153. See Thorton, supra note 36 (quoting Ward Bower).
154. See Mullally, supra note 2 (quoting Andrew Nickels, risk manager at Zurich
Professional); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Essential Principles for Law Firm General
Counsel, 53 KAN. L. REv. 805, 812 (2005) (arguing that law firm general counsel should be
equity partners to give them credibility in the firm and signal management's support for
the position).
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This Part questions this structural theory of firm counsels'
authority. I find that respondents in full-time positions and those
appointed from outside the firm are as likely as respondents in part-
time positions to report that they have sufficient authority to be
effective in their roles. The sources of their authority tend to be
somewhat different than those of part-time and insider firm counsel:
whereas part-time firm counsel tend to rely on their ownership
interest and personal ties to firm leaders, full-time firm counsel are
more likely to draw on external professional networks and the
demands of insurers. Nevertheless, the respondents' comments
indicate that there are a variety of potential sources of professional
authority for firm counsel.
These findings suggest a need to rethink the nature of firm
counsel's authority, and perhaps the nature of managerial authority in
modern law firms more generally.'55 In the case of firm counsel, my
findings point to a market model of authority, whereby firm counsel
build their in-house practice over time and through a variety of
methods-much like successful partners do in an outside practice.
Respondents' comments suggest that the key ingredients of success in
this effort are personality and the support of firm management-
resources that potentially are available to full-time and part-time firm
counsel alike.
This is not to say there are no meaningful differences between
firm counsel with authority over conflicts, which by all accounts is a
core ethical and strategic issue within law firms, and those whose
jurisdiction extends primarily to more peripheral matters, such as
vendor contracts and the terms of the office lease. I find, however,
that most firm counsels' jurisdictions have expanded significantly over
time. Thus, it may be too early to judge the authority of firm counsel
from outside of the firm.
155. The sociological literature traditionally has emphasized the tension between
bureaucratic authority based on holding a particular title or office, and professional
authority based on expertise (or control over clients). See Talcott Parsons, Introduction to
Max Weber, in MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS 59, 60 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons eds. & trans., 1947)
(criticizing Weber for failing to draw this distinction); W. Richard Scott, Professionals in
Bureaucracies-Areas of Conflict, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 265, 270-71 (Howard M.
Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1966) (arguing that bureaucratic authority threatens
professional norms); see also NELSON, supra note 41, at 10, 205-08 (discussing the tension
between bureaucratic and professional authority in law firms). As others have cautioned,
however, it is important not to overstate the distinction between bureaucratic and collegial
organizations. Id. at 201. In particular, this distinction ignores the growing category of
"managerial professionals" who "perform the complex and highly political task of
managing practicing professionals." Rabban, supra note 87, at 1841.
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A. In-Firm Practice as a Market
To some extent, all this talk of professional "authority" is
misleading, since most firm counsel have little hierarchical or coercive
power. As one law firm management consultant points out, in a
corporation, managers cooperate with the general counsel because
they have to, while in a law firm, partners cooperate with firm counsel
because they want to.156 Thus, in most firms, firm counsel must drum
up their own business. Consider the following comments by two full-
time firm counsel:
[After the focus group] I'll be getting on the train, to go to [a
different city], and tomorrow at lunch I will talk to all the new
attorneys who joined our [] office since last year, so they have a
face they can attach with a phone number ... and say, "here's
what I do, here's what resources I have that are available to
you, here's some rule provisions that might come up sooner
rather than later, here's some firm policies to be aware of."
That's Thursday lunch. Friday lunch is talking to all the
attorneys in the [] office on recent cases and ethics opinions in
[that jurisdiction]. I think getting out there, and being there,
brings people to me. [B4]. 57
I look at every lawyer in the firm as my client. I think how to
market myself. I look at ethics and risk management programs
as advertising. And usually advertising is not all that effective.
Necessary but not sufficient. What is the most effective way?
Developing people's trust. Is it effective to pick up the phone
and say, "Do you have any problems?" Generally not. But if
you go to someone's office and say, "let's talk," you find things
out. [04].
Most respondents say that to be effective, firm counsel must walk
softly and show the utmost deference to partners who come-
voluntarily-for advice. Deference to partners' autonomy is
especially important in decisions about business intake-as even
respondents with sizable equity stakes in their firms acknowledge. As
one part-time firm counsel said:
156. See Flahardy et al., supra note 4, at 150 (attributing this line to James Jones,
director of the Hildebrandt Institute); see also Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 19, at 106
(stating that, as firm counsel, "we have opposed efforts to make [in-house] consultation
mandatory" because "we believe that our advice will be best received if it is voluntarily
sought").
157. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 588.
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If you say no all the time, people will go underground. And if
they think that you give them correct advice-that you are on
their side, you would like to do what you can to facilitate the
acceptance of the matter but you know where the lines need to
be drawn-they'll come to you. [A5]. 58
One full-time firm counsel who focuses primarily on conflicts and
business intake explains his strategy as follows:
To be most effective, you have to go through a process of
convincing your colleagues that "I'm not saying no, I'm just
telling you all these things because eventually you are going to
say no, and we are going to get where we want" .... Standing
up in front of a group and saying "thou shalt not"-it tends not
to work very effectively when you have 600 owners of a firm
and each one believes he or she is autonomous. [A7]. 59
Or, in the words of 110, the full-time firm counsel with the chief of
staff, quoted above, "[y]ou don't want to be Doctor No. Instead, I'm
Doctor Yes, But. ... " [110].
A number of respondents emphasized the personality
component of the job. Firm counsel have to be "approachable" [14]
and "nonjudgmental." [C2].' 6° As 110 put it, "there's no room for a
scold in the general counsel's office. If you need to tell a partner not
to do something, that's when I go out and hire a law professor at
some ethics center." [110]. One respondent summed up it up follows:
How do you get people to come forward with issues so they
may be resolved in the most appropriate way?... That's the
personality component of this particular job. If you have the
right person operating in the right environment, you draw
people to you and it becomes part of the culture. [A12].' 6
Thus, respondents' authority is developed primarily through
internal marketing based on factors such as deference to the client,
personality, and fit. And while insiders may develop this authority
before they take on the role of firm counsel, outsiders also may
develop it over time. Although respondents agree that it takes a
"special person," I10 said, "I have talked to several people who have
been embraced faster than they expected to be." [110]. One
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 587.
161. Id.
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respondent who became part-time firm counsel shortly after joining
his firm describes his experience as follows:
I was kind of dropped in from outside. I was the director of the
state lawyers' board. And it did take some time both to get to
know people and for me to get to know, particularly-I was a
trial lawyer ... [and] I remember somebody talking about, "I
have a securitization question," and [thinking], "that sounds
like a security. What is it?" That type of thing. It took a while
to get up to speed. But I think that's manageable over a period
of time. [A14].
B. The Expanding Role of Firm Counsel
It probably helps that there is great demand for firm counsels'
services. By all accounts, the job expands from the minute one takes
it on. Numerous respondents in both samples grumbled about the
demands of the job, especially part-timers who were trying to hang on
to some kind of outside practice. The following comment is from a
part-time firm counsel at a 175-lawyer firm:
I see tension building up. When I first started doing this job it
didn't take that much of my time but I have kind of expanded
the role as I have learned more and become more experienced
and my practice has started to shrink. It's what happens to
managing partners, the exact same thing. They see their
practice shrinking, they work themselves out of the market. If
you are a managing partner for five or six years and you step
down from that, you don't have any clients. [13].
Part of the pressure stems from constant day-to-day questions
from lawyers. As one respondent said, "[e]very day, it's a constant
flow of questions .... They don't usually take more than ten or
fifteen minutes each, but sometimes there's research that has to be
done." [C3]. 162 Another said, "I answer the phone all the time.
There's constant interruption.... ." [C2]. 16 3 Thus, several part-time
respondents said that they contemplated moving into a full-time in-
house role at some point. I10 reported, "I know several [firm
counsel] who claim to be doing it half time and every time I talk to
them that number goes up." [110].
162. Id. at 586.
163. Id.
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Even full-time firm counsel worry about keeping up with the job.
Several respondents who have moved from part-time to full-time
positions said that, once a resource was made available, the work
expanded to fill their time. 164 One respondent said, "[m]y hours are
worse than full-time outside practice. I go from first thing in the
morning to late at night because of the people on the West Coast. I
get phone calls all day Saturday at home. I work 250-300 hours per
month." [111]. Several respondents talked about taking on staff. As
110 observed, "[a]t any firm of 500 or so lawyers, there's enough for
one full-time person to do. There is certainly enough at 1,000 ....
[I]f there is someone who is a point person, people jump all over it."
[110] .165
Thus, firms' resistance to full-timers and outsiders may be a bit of
a myth. According to one respondent:
I do think in some ways there is a kind of "us versus them" that,
you know, nobody is going to understand our culture like us.
Which is not necessarily true. For example, we hired a pro
bono lawyer from outside and the first idea was, they are not
going to fit. She is not going to stay .... We ended up with a
couple of people basically mentoring her the first year, as in,
"this is a delicate issue, this is what you don't understand, here
are the politics here," and after a year she understood it. And
it's like she has been there all along. [A13].
C. Sources of Authority
Respondents agree that the most important source of firm
counsel's authority is the support of firm management.166 In the
words of one respondent, "none of this stuff works unless you have
the power of the firm behind you. Whether or not you have
individual power or how you get things done, whether it's because
you are a big rainmaker or have a pleasing personality, you need [top
management support]." [A13].' 67
164. Id. at 576-77 (quoting several respondents on this point); see also supra note 82
and accompanying text (noting that the work tends to expand to fill the available time).
165. See McElligott, supra note 25, at 21 (quoting Holland & Knight general counsel
Kinder Cannon). Cannon, a full-time general counsel since 2000, says he is often
"overwhelmed" by his workload. According to Cannon, 'Jilt is clearly a full-time job. I
don't know how else I would do it." Id.
166. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 582-83 (quoting several respondents
from the initial sample about the importance of visible support from top management).
167. Id. at 582 (alteration in original).
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One respondent referred to this factor as "management buy-in."
As he noted, "they always say how important this function is ....
[But] when the ethics part of the retreat is at eight a.m. on Sunday,
that's a bad sign." [03]. Said another respondent, who had been
appointed from outside the firm, "I was right after finances in the
partner retreat." [04].
Most respondents, including "professional" firm counsel,
reported having strong management support. In fact, the only two
reports of trouble came from respondents whose firms appeared to
have weak central management and to cater to individual equity
interests. The first example comes from a part-time firm counsel who
left his firm over a dispute with firm management:
I would like to go back and be the general counsel at some big
firm, but I would only do it if I could be an equity partner,
because that is the only way you can have a voice...
Q. When you say "voice"-?
A. To the extent you are talking "voice," you're talking about
walking down to the corner office and telling some big
rainmaker, "No. We're not going to do that," and that's it. He
doesn't go to the managing partner and come back to you seven
minutes later and say "I'm doing it." At my old firm, it didn't
matter if something was unethical; if the person had enough
business, they could do it and I couldn't stop them. And to the
extent that I could stop them it was only because I had a three
million dollar book of business myself. Otherwise, I wouldn't
even have been a speed bump. [15].
The other example comes from the full-time assistant general
counsel, who says of herself and the general counsel:
I don't think we get the kind of support most general counsel
get .... I don't think if the general counsel said no way in hell
are we doing that that he would get overruled, but sometimes I
tell people they can't do something and they say, okay, well, I
am talking to [the managing partner], so I just copy him on the
response.
Q. Is this in the conflicts context?
A. Yes. If there is a huge client that the firm really, really
wants to bring in and we think there's a problem and they really
want it, they're going to bring the client in. [Ill].
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Unfortunately, I do not have independent, systematic data about
the strength or structure of management of the firms in the sample.
Obviously, it would be interesting to know to what extent the role of
firm counsel is shaped by firm management versus firm counsel
themselves;168 and whether certain management styles and structures
are more conducive to the success of firm counsel. We touched on
this issue in our initial analysis, by noting that compensated in-house
positions appeared to be more likely in firms that had other
centralized management structures;169 however, we did not then, and I
do not now, have sufficient data to do anything other than speculate
on this point.
It seems likely, however, that as the position of firm counsel
becomes institutionalized within law firms, we may begin to see more
conflict between firm counsel and management. Some firms may
appoint firm counsel because it seems like the right thing to do,
without fully considering the integration of the position within the
firm's management structure. Other firms may want firm counsel so
badly that they appoint the wrong person. Thus, the relationship
between firm counsel and management will be an interesting topic for
research as the position matures.
Besides management support, professional firm counsel cite a
variety of potential sources of authority in their dealings with
partners. One respondent has found it effective to refer to "how
other firms do it" as a strategy for bringing resistant partners around.
The following comment comes from a full-time firm counsel who was
appointed from outside the firm:
There are pros and cons [to being an outside appointment]. I
have not grown up shoulder to shoulder with these people who
are now partners in the firm. But when you come from the
outside you can tell everyone "that's how other firms do it;
that's how our peer firms do it" and that is like the ace of
trumps .... Three or four times I have come in and said, we
should do X, and there has been a lot of squawking, and I've
said, as a kind of a gambit, let me talk to our peer firms, eight or
ten firms, and find out how others do it, and I already know the
answer. Or sometimes it is educational, like if the patent
attorneys do it one way and [?] do it another, I'll ask them to
make the calls. I'll say, "look, why don't you call a few people
168. Thanks to Elizabeth Gorman for raising this issue.
169. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 570-72 (discussing the effect of firm
management philosophy on the development of the in-house role).
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and see what they do and get back to me." And we end up
getting to the right answer. [I1].
Several respondents get results by invoking the demands of the
insurer' or reminding partners about past claims against the firm.
As 110 reports:
I explain to people that "insurers are breathing down our necks
every day." Everyone understands the need to be able to
continue to pay for malpractice insurance. In many
jurisdictions, an ethics violation is per se negligence and can be
a bootstrap for a malpractice claim. How we measure up to
competitors includes the professionalization of risk
management. [110].
Another example comes from a part-time general counsel at a
1,000-plus lawyer firm:
You have to be very open. I'm surprised the number of times I
talk about cases where the firm has been sued and people will
say, "you mean, we've been sued?" Being open about it really
increases everyone's sensitivity. [03].
Thus my findings contradict the conventional wisdom that full-
time firm counsel and those appointed from outside the firm
necessarily will face resistance or be frozen out of key decisions. As
respondents' comments suggest, professional firm counsel have a
variety of strategies for attracting business and making themselves
heard within the firm; and firm counsels' substantive jurisdictions
have a tendency to expand over time. Indeed, in today's competitive
business climate, in which firms increasingly are concerned about
professional liability, 7' I predict that firms' demand for professional
firm counsel will only increase. Part IV considers what this will mean
for the scope and substance of compliance efforts within firms.
170. According to Robert E. O'Malley, former Chief of Loss Prevention Counsel for
the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, it is common to hear lawyers say, of some
proposed loss prevention policy, "I can't sell this to my firm, but if you tell us we have to
do it, we'll do it." See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss
Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 349-
50 n.154 (1997) (citing an interview with Robert E. O'Malley, Apr. 1997).
171. See Flahardy et al., supra note 4, at 50 (quoting Hildebrandt Institute director
James Jones as to firms' increasing exposure and concerns about liability).
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IV. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS?
The legal ethics literature tends to portray large firm lawyers as
unethical or at least "ethically challenged. 72  Owing perhaps to the
relative weakness of disciplinary enforcement in the large firm
context, 173 and more recently to various corporate scandals involving
lawyers,174 large firm partners, especially, are viewed as tending
toward self-serving, avaricious behavior 175 and non-compliance with
professional regulation.176 Even the most nuanced pronouncements
on large firm lawyers' ethics tend to be somewhat negative and
judgmental. For instance, a recent study of legal ethics among large
firm litigators concluded:
Large-firm partners ... [tend] to deny the moral dimensions of
their work entirely, and to reduce most issues to either ethical
rules or pragmatic strategies.... [O]ur results suggest that the
dominant logic of constraint among large-firm litigators is one
of "ethical pragmatism," in which ... inconvenient ethical
strictures are assumed ... to have pragmatically manageable
real meanings. This logic differs significantly from the "ethical
172. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces
to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 203, 204 (2004) (stating that a substantial number of lawyers in private practice
"can be described as ethically challenged") (emphasis omitted); cf. Timothy P. Terrell,
Turmoil at the Normative Core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons from the
"Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY L.J. 87, 96 (2000) (criticizing this view and
arguing instead that lawyers are "metaethically challenged").
173. See Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to
Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 58-63 (2002) (noting the
limited resources of most disciplinary agencies and the lack of demand for disciplinary
action by large-firm clients); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11, 25 (1991) (discussing the obstacles to disciplinary enforcement
against large firm lawyers).
174. See, e.g., LUCIAN T. PERA & BRIAN S. FAUGHNAN, PARADISE TARNISHED:
TODAY'S SOURCES OF LIABILITY EXPOSURE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 7-37
(Association of Corporate Counsel, ed., 2005) (reporting on seven high-profile scandals
between 1999 and 2003 in which corporate counsel were named as defendants); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185, 1185-90 (2003) (examining lawyers' culpability for transactions in the Enron
scandal).
175. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 209-15 (discussing sixteen cases of
billing fraud by senior partners at prominent law firms); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a
Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession,
52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 906 (1999) (arguing that large firm partners' lives are "dominated
by money").
176. See Chambliss, supra note 3, at 137-38 (arguing that the legal ethics literature is
dominated by a "legalistic" model of professional regulation that tends to portray lawyers
as noncompliant in the absence of disciplinary enforcement).
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moralism" of judges .... [and] lay conceptions of ethics and
morals as ... value commitments.177
Further, while most commentators would acknowledge the role
of firm culture and other organizational factors in shaping individual
norms and conduct, many are nevertheless suspicious of firm-level (or
"entity") regulation as a means for promoting accountability and
ethical conduct among individual lawyers.178 Opponents of law firm
discipline, for example, argue that the regulation of law firms as
entities would undermine individual accountability, by "allowing
responsible partners and supervisors to escape personal
accountability" '179 and signaling a "lack of personal responsibility for
ethics compliance.""18  Some scholars raise similar concerns about
firms' increasing reliance on in-house ethics specialists and law firm
general counsel-or what Professor Margaret Raymond has called
"the professionalization of ethics."'' According to Professor
Raymond:
[T]he internal focus on ethics specialists ... suggests that ethics
is just another area of specialization, one in which someone else
is developing expertise so you don't have to. This runs the risk
of shuttling the consideration of ethics to the designated
individuals, taking ethical issues out of mainstream discourse.
182
My findings tend to cast doubt on both of these views. At the
risk of sounding like someone who has gotten too fond of her
subjects, my impression is that the respondents in my study are pretty
ethical people, even by ivory tower standards. Most respondents
have a long record of service on bar association committees and task
forces devoted to ethical issues, and a number have served as adjunct
professors of legal ethics (a sure sign of high standards). As research
177. Suchman, supra note 51, at 845-46 (summarizing the main findings of Ethics:
Beyond the Rules, a study sponsored by the American Bar Association's Section of
Litigation). The study was initiated in response to "a number of highly publicized cases of
misconduct by ... large firm litigators." Id. at 837-38.
178. See Chambliss, supra note 3, at 120-21 (arguing that lawyers' resistance to
centralized management "significantly inhibits the profession's approach to lawyer
regulation").
179. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, A.B.A. ETHICS 2000 COMM'N, FINAL REPORT-
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
mlove article.html (reporting the Commission's reasons for withdrawing its initial support
for law firm discipline).
180. O'Sullivan, supra note 173, at 20-21.
181. Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
153, 167 (2005).
182. Id. at 159-60.
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subjects, respondents were generous with their time, available when
they promised to be, and eager to help me convey the importance of
systematic self-regulation by firms.
With a few exceptions, respondents also portray the lawyers in
their firms as ethical--or at least inclined toward compliance with
firm policy and ethical rules. Indeed, respondents' comments suggest
that most lawyers are hungry for guidance about the rules and how to
comply. Of course, it is tempting to write off such comments as self-
serving, especially if one starts with the premise that large firm
lawyers tend to be unethical. One also might argue that what passes
for "ethical" in large law firms is problematic. Alternatively,
however, one might adopt a more sympathetic and respectful
approach, which imagines that most large firm lawyers probably are a
lot like most of us. From this perspective, respondents' comments
may be telling us something important about lawyers' interest in
ethical guidance and the benefits of management investment in the
firm counsel role.
I do find evidence of "ethical pragmatism" 183 in the conflict-of-
interest context. In fact, several respondents explicitly criticized
moralistic approaches to conflicts. However, respondents' pragmatic
attitude toward potential conflicts between complex corporate clients
contrasts sharply with their attitude toward conduct involving
dishonesty, such as billing fraud. Thus, rather than concluding that
respondents "deny the moral dimensions of their work,"'" I suggest
that the rules governing conflicts of interest may be unreflective of
the moral dimensions of conflicts in the large firm context.
A. Respondents' Professional Commitments
Most respondents in the initial sample were clearly professionally
committed to promoting ethics and regulatory compliance in their
firms and the profession more broadly. Over two-thirds had long
records of service on bar committees dealing with ethics and
professional responsibility matters and several had served on state or
local lawyer disciplinary boards.'85  Twelve of the thirty-two
respondents had law teaching experience, most as adjunct professors
of legal ethics.186
183. Suchman, supra note 51, at 845.
184. Id.
185. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 585-86 (reporting on respondents'
personal and professional characteristics).
186. Id. at 585.
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Litigation was the most common practice specialty among
respondents, and all but one respondent had significant litigation
experience.187 Other common practice specialties included insurance,
professional liability, banking, and bankruptcy. 188  All of the
respondents in the initial sample expressed a strong commitment to
"protecting their firms' reputations and interests.' 89
The sixteen respondents in the 2005 sample have strikingly
similar profiles. Ten have served on one or more bar ethics or
discipline committees, and at least four have held leadership roles.
Although I do not have systematic data on respondents' law teaching
experience, six respondents have written law review or bar journal
articles addressing ethics and professional responsibility issues.
As in the initial sample, litigation is the most common practice
specialty among the respondents, followed closely by insurance and
professional liability. Six respondents have practiced or continue to
practice in the ethics and professional liability area. Two respondents
have served as ethics or firm counsel in more than one law firm.
There is little correlation between the structure of respondents'
positions and their previous specialization in ethics and professional
liability matters. For instance, some part-time firm counsel have
relatively little service or practice experience in the area, whereas
others are highly specialized. The following comment comes from
part-time firm counsel at an eighty-lawyer firm:
I had worked in legal malpractice defense since [the early
1990s] ... so from that I had worked before the [state
disciplinary committee] and had a significant interest in ethics.
We have also recently established a practice group with the goal
of representing lawyers in a variety of issues, risk management,
ethics, disciplinary issues, character and fitness, and providing
in-house training. [18].
Likewise, some full-time firm counsel are highly specialized in
ethics and professional responsibility matters whereas others came
into the job with relatively little experience. 110 describes his
background as follows:
I was an insurance lawyer and the partner originally doing it
was a corporate lawyer and he didn't have a clue about
187. Id. The exception was the one associate in the sample, who was being groomed to
take over the role of firm counsel from her supervising partner. See supra note 72.
188. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 585.
189. Id. at 585-86.
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insurance, and it came at a time when we were moving out of
[one insurance provider] and going with [another] and they
wanted someone who knew insurance. I do not have any
specific ethics credentials. I had been on the ethics committee
for ten years but I was not an ethics wonk. [110].
I also found no systematic difference between respondents who
grew up in their firms and those few respondents who were brought in
from outside the firm. In particular, respondents from outside the
firm appeared no less committed to protecting the firm's interests; if
anything, they were more intent on proving their value to partners
and firm management. As one outsider reported, "I did a ten-year
claims history and it was news to them. They do the math and think,
'this is a really important area.' But it is a cultural change in terms of
getting it on the radar screen." [04].
Thus, there is little evidence that "professional" firm counsel
have systematically different attitudes or orientations to the role than
firm counsel who grew up in their firms or those who continue to
serve outside clients.
B. Lawyers' Tendency Toward Compliance
Most respondents have a positive view of the lawyers who work
in their firms and portray partners, by and large, as tending toward
compliance with ethical rules. The following comments are typical:
I don't think we have too many ethical concerns. Most people
are pretty good. It is more a matter of getting them to comply
with firm policy on how to open files; engagement letters. Not
starting work without a conflicts check. [13].
Situations in which you have to confront outright dishonesty
and unethical conduct are rare. Most of the job is proactive-
not maybe in the sense that it should be, holding programs and
training and such-but solving problems before they become,
you know, problems. [15].
This is not to say there are no rogue partners or badly-managed
law firms. As several respondents noted, not all partners come to
them for advice. According to one part-time firm counsel:
I'm never sure whether any of the major conflict issues or
ethical issues are brought to my attention. There's a great
variation among members of the firm in terms of who I deal
with ... I find that I spend a lot of time with some partners and
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virtually no time with others and it can't be that the ones I don't
spend any time with don't have any ethical problems. [A9]. 19°
Respondents worry especially about the "weird guy" with the
"big billings." Consider the following comment:
I haven't really had any real ethical crisis, or ones where I am
shaking my head. I do hear from colleagues about the guy
down the hall, that partner, he's a weird guy who doesn't report
to anyone, but he brings in big billings and no one wants to
question him. He plays by his own rules. Like the Sidley
Austin partner in the tax shelter matter.191 He brought in huge
money so no one questioned him, but they realized he wasn't
playing by the game plan. So, in terms of what keeps me up at
night. [112].
As discussed in Part III, two respondents reported having
insufficient management support on client intake decisions; 192 and
many respondents emphasized the importance of "picking one's
spots" [110] on intake matters. As one respondent said, "[i]f you say
no all the time, people will go underground." [A5]. 193 Thus, in some
firms, obviously, there is some tension between firm counsel and
management regarding client intake decisions.
Yet the fact that not all partners rely on firm counsel--or that
not all firms are willing to question the weird guy with the big
billings--does not mean that most large firm lawyers are unethical or
that the presence of firm counsel undermines individual
accountability. On the contrary, my findings suggest that firm counsel
serve as a critical resource for many busy but well-intentioned lawyers
who "want to practice law the right way ... [but] haven't looked at
the rules of professional responsibility since law school." [15].
As noted above, many respondents report being bombarded
daily with questions from lawyers who are "freaking out and want an
answer right away." [111]. As one full-time respondent reported:
190. Id. at 587.
191. This comment presumably refers to the tax shelter work of former Sidley Austin
partner R.J. Ruble, who was fired from that firm in 2004. See Charles Toutant, Settlement
Proposed in Class Action Over Porous KPMG Tax Shelters, N.J. L.J., Oct. 3, 2005, at 7
(noting that "Ruble wrote more than 600 letters to clients declaring the shelters would
withstand Internal Revenue Service scrutiny"); Sidley Austin Tax Chief Moves to Mofo,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 2005, at 1 (reporting that Ruble was fired from Sidley Austin for
violating the firm's partnership agreement).
192. See supra Part III.C.
193. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 588.
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People call me at home, and everything is an emergency. I was
going to wallpaper my office with those little yellow message
slips, all of them say "it's an emergency, please call me within
the next five minutes." I could work twenty-four hours a day
.. .[ 1]94
Further, firm counsel who are compensated for their in-house
service tend to be proactive in building resources and systems for
promoting compliance. 95 As one full-time firm counsel put it:
The single biggest most important risk management initiative
our firm has put in place is to have a proactive general counsel.
I do this full time. It is a big job. So the single biggest thing a
firm can do is to have someone worry about those kinds of
issues on a full-time basis. [04].
Thus, rather than assuming the worst about large-firm lawyers,
we might do better to focus on strategies for promoting firm counsels'
authority and the development of a shared conversation about the
moral dimensions of their work. As one respondent observed:
People in firms are reluctant to talk to academics because they
tend to view academics as ideological. There is this idea that
lawyers are always trying to cut corners. But lawyers call me all
the time with questions. Once the firm began providing this
service, and lawyers knew there was someone there who had an
answer-lawyers are big rules-followers. [I1].
C. "Ethics" v. "Risk Management"
One topic about which a shared conversation would be useful
is the profession's approach to conflicts of interest in the large firm
context. Respondents talk about conflicts very differently than other
ethical issues. In the conflicts context, respondents speak in terms of
"probability" and "risk," and their language reflects the "avoidance
or suspicion of any moral calculus" 196-similar to the approach of
large firm litigators to the rules governing pre-trial discovery. 197 As
110 said, in the context of conflicts:
194. Id. at 586.
195. Id. at 574-75 (providing examples from the initial sample).
196. Frenkel et al., supra note 50, at 705.
197. See Suchman, supra note 51, at 845 (quoting a partner who said that in litigation,
"the area of morals is a murky place to be, and you don't want to go there").
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We commit ethical violations, by someone's definition, every
day. Everything involves risk. It's shades of gray .... So
whether it is unethical in some clear way is usually not the
question. The question is: what's the risk? It's a legal positivist
[standard]. [110].
Or, consider the following hypothetical from a full-time firm
counsel at a 300-lawyer firm:
Here's a tough issue. Suppose you have a firm where there is
big possible piece of business but there is a possible adverse
issue to a former client. And the [current] client is a grown up.
Is it or is it not "substantially related"? That's where you enter
a probabilistic world and think, what are the odds of them
bringing [a disqualification motion]? They may have a glass
house on their side. Lots of federal courts do this by the seat of
their pants-disqualification judgments are not appealable-so
there is no case law. They cite some really weird things. And
the client says okay, but the disqualification motion is on your
dime. And the firm says okay. "Substantially related" is not a
physicist's test. It depends on the judge you draw, what court
you're in. Some would argue you have to go for it. [I1].
In fact, several firm counsel expressed strong opinions that a
normative approach to conflicts is misguided-and disingenuous-in
the large firm context. The following comments are representative:
We take risks all the time and we know what they are. God
knows the courts get them confused. Able lawyers come in and
say "there's a conflict of interest, what could be worse[?]"
Thirty to forty percent of malpractice claims have in them a
conflict of interest, although it is often hard to connect the
conflict with any actual harm. But the jury goes to town. What
you and I would consider a risk issue, not a moral issue, gets
treated by the courts and juries as indistinct from the drug
addict lawyer who stole money from his client trust accounts. It
is something that really frosts me. For big firms and lawyers it
is something that is self-enforced in every other part of the
world .... There are lots of foaming-at-the-mouth moralists in
the field .... [110].
I mean, loyalty is important but if you are adverse to some
affiliate in some whole different line of business I don't think
that is disloyal. You have some huge monstrosity of a client
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and you can use that to create a sideshow-you can make a lot
of hay out of that; but some courts are saying it is just as much
an appearance of impropriety to make some ranting motion as
it is to have a conflict in the first place. If you can't point to a
harm you are going to suffer, you shouldn't file the motion.
[Ill].
By contrast, three respondents told me off-the-record stories
about lawyer misconduct that they clearly viewed as shocking and
shameful-so shameful that they did not want me to report the details
even without attribution. I am free to say that all three stories
involved some type of billing fraud. I also would add that two of the
stories involved misconduct by associates rather than partners, and
none of the stories struck me as being quite as shocking as-
respondents seemed to believe. In any case, in discussing these
stories, respondents used explicitly normative terms such as
"stealing" and "fraud."
Thus, while it may be that large firm lawyers tend toward a
lamentable "ethical pragmatism," in which ethics rules are
interpreted to be consistent with the lawyer's own ends, 98 it is also
possible that this pragmatic approach is restricted to certain types of
issues-for instance, those in which the clients are "grown ups" and
everyone is in the same "game," '99 such as large firm litigation and
conflicts of interest.2"' Indeed, this may be an area in which morality
demands a pragmatic approach, rather than scrupulous compliance
with formal rules.2"' Certainly firm counsel are not alone in finding
the rules governing conflicts of interest impractical or worse in thq
large firm context. As Ill notes, some courts have begun to crack
down on the strategic use of motions to disqualify,2 2  and
commentators increasingly are pointing to the waste and abuse
198. Id. at 843-44.
199. Id. at 850 (finding that large firm litigators "described actual discovery practice in
the language of adversarial gamesmanship, as a highly stylized competition in which each
side could be counted upon to employ a fairly predictable repertoire of maneuvers").
200. See Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective
Conflict Waivers as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship-A Response to Mr. Fox,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2001) (arguing that sophisticated parties should be
allowed to enter into prospective conflicts waiver agreements).
201. See Suchman, supra note 51, at 854 (reporting that "walking the line" between
overcaution and overzealousness "was the morally preferred position" among large firm
litigators).
202. See, e.g., Matthew F. Boyer, In the Wake of Infotechnology: Stricter Scrutiny of
Attorney Disqualification Motions, 22 DEL. LAW. 16, 16 (2005) (arguing that Delaware
courts have moved from resolving "all doubts in favor of disqualification," to viewing
disqualification as "a severe sanction, that 'is not favored' " (citations omitted)).
2006] 1567
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
associated with attorney disqualification.2"3 Thus, there is room for
argument about the moral dimensions of conflicts issues in the large
firm context.
V. IMPLICATIONS
From a regulatory standpoint, the professionalization of firm
counsel is a positive development. Most basically, professionalization
is reflective of law firms' increasing investment in self-regulation and
the associated development of a market niche for compliance
specialists within firms. The formalization and increasing
specialization of the firm counsel position has helped to clarify the
firm's identity as the client, and expanded the resources available to
firm members, without compromising the authority of firm counsel or
necessarily undermining their involvement in sensitive and strategic
issues. Thus, as to the central question of this Article-what does the
professionalization of firm counsel mean for the quality of self-
regulation by large law firms?-my findings are unequivocal.
Professional firm counsel contribute enormously to effective self-
regulation by firms.
That being said, there are several findings that warrant
continuing attention and research. First, as discussed in Part II, firm
counsel who are appointed from outside the firm appear to start off
with a somewhat different jurisdiction than firm counsel who grew up
in their firms, with more attention to staff and administrative matters
and less involvement in conflicts and ethics.2" Because the outside
appointment of firm counsel is still a recent and relatively rare
phenomenon, it is not yet clear to what extent this finding indicates a
necessary or permanent shift in the orientation of firm counsel; or, if
so, whether it is tied to the structural characteristics of the firm
counsel position. As noted above, my findings on this point are
consistent with findings on the jurisdiction of general counsel in Am
Law 200 firms,205 many of whom are in part-time positions26 and all of
203. See Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm
Disqualification in the Courts, 8 GEO. J LEGAL ETHICs 831, 832 (1995) (estimating that
there are disqualification orders in two-thirds of all lawsuits); Ronald D. Rotunda,
Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 655, 681 (1997) (noting that many companies conduct business "through a series
of corporate entities ... using an impenetrable fog of subsidiaries and affiliates"); Leah
Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Attorney
Disqualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 667,671-73 (2005) (noting the inconsistency in
the substantive law of attorney disqualification).
204. See supra Part II.B.
205. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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whom came from inside their firms.207 Thus it may be that the shift I
observe reflects the expansion of the position; or is related to firm
characteristics, such as size; or is simply a blip in the data.
For instance, several respondents in the initial sample reported
that they serve primarily as the "point person" for a wide a range of
issues, many of which they do not handle themselves.28 According to
one full-time firm counsel at 750-lawyer firm:
I think the firm looked at [the creation of my] position as
having a point person. You can decide if it is a point person or
a lightning rod.., but a person that's out there that can serve as
... the first point of contact ... sort of a locus point for people
to come to with all sorts of different questions on all sorts of
different topics, from senior people to the most junior people
.... Having been around since 1984 when I started, and always
having been at the same firm, even in the summers, if it's not in
my jurisdiction, I know where to send it. So I have that sort
of-mediator is not the right word but-facilitator role. [B4].2°9
Thus, some of the shift I observe may be related to the
ascendance of this managerial model, rather than a reflection of
cultural resistance to full-time firm counsel or those appointed from
outside the firm. This model may be especially prevalent in large,
multi-office firms. The following comment comes from part-time firm
counsel at a 175-lawyer firm:
General counsel of really big firms generally have assistant
general counsel. They assume a managerial function where
they are supervising other general counsel. It's less hands-on
lawyering and more like managing problems. They become like
litigation managers in corporations, or ... specialists in
employment law, human relations law. But not as hands-on,
across-the-board as someone like me. Especially in firms that
are more spread out geographically. They are going to spend a
lot of time on the road, meeting people and making sure they
are all aware of the latest policies. [13].
This does not mean that the issue of cultural resistance drops out
of the analysis entirely, however. Even if the managerial model is
206. See FLASH SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3 (reporting that 68% of respondents were
part-time general counsel in 2005).
207. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
208. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 3, at 575-76.
209. Id. at 575.
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primarily a consequence of firm size and structure, questions about
who has jurisdiction over conflicts and ethics and the nature of that
person's authority remain important in any analysis of law firm self-
regulation. Thus, the scope of firm counsels' jurisdiction and its
relationship to ethics and regulatory issues remain important
questions for future research.
A second finding warranting further attention is the growing
importance of professional networks among firm counsel. As Part III
argues, appeals to external networks and the demands of insurers are
important sources of authority for "professional" (full-time and
outside) firm counsel.21° Indeed, one of the key findings of the paper
is that the professional authority that comes from membership in such
networks may substitute for the personal authority that comes from
long tenure in the firm.
This makes the development of professional networks-and the
standards that are defined and transmitted through such networks-
critical variables in determining the future scope and effectiveness of
self-regulation by firms. To the extent that firm counsel develop
strong professional networks that unite around a particular standard
for compliance, this standard can be expected to define the industry
standard for years to come. If firm counsel fail to develop strong
networks, or if such networks reinforce the wrong standard, the
consequences could be similarly far-reaching.
The growing importance of professional networks has both
research and political implications. As a research matter, it suggests
the need to examine closely the role of insurers and law firm
consultants, both of whom have a stake in the authority and ideology
of firm counsel. It also will be important simply to map the networks
that develop, taking note of divisions by firm size, client base, and the
structure of the firm counsel position. My impression thus far is that
firm size and location are important determinants of the professional
identities of firm counsel, with firm counsel in large firms based in
major cities gravitating toward different networks than those in
smaller firms in smaller cities. I suspect that the identity of the firm's
primary insurer also may play an important role in shaping
associations among firm counsel. These are merely impressions,
however, offered as starting points for future research.
As a political matter, the development of professional networks
among firm counsel is an opportunity for academics who want to
contribute to the effectiveness of professional self-regulation. As
210. See supra Part III.C.
1570 [Vol. 84
LAW FIRM IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
Fred Zacharias has observed, "the [legal] ethics codes and the
scholarly literature are replete with empirical assumptions that
require empirical testing and justification. ' 211 Yet, empirical ethics
research is "notoriously difficult, ' 212 especially when the researchers
are viewed-perhaps rightly-as being judgmental. The only
consistent finding in the empirical ethics literature is that most people
view themselves as more ethical than other people.213
Firm counsel, however, are an emerging and likely to be
influential group who are right now in the process of developing a
distinct identity and professional ideology. This ideology, in turn, has
the potential to influence a generation or more of lawyers who "grow
up" in large firms. Thus, this is an important conversation for
academics to join. Academic attention through research and
conferences could contribute significantly to the development of
collaborative networks and shared professional norms between legal
ethics teachers and large firm practitioners. Promoting the visibility
and importance of firm counsel also could contribute to firms'
investment in the firm counsel position and enhance firm counsels'
authority within firms.
I conclude by quoting a somewhat lengthy exchange with 111, the
full-time assistant general counsel quoted at several points
throughout the paper. More than any other, this exchange
summarizes the demands and rewards of the firm counsel position,
and the professional frustrations and dedication of the lawyers who
hold it.
Q. Are you compensated like a partner?
A. I am a partner. I am compensated on the low end of the
partner level. [The general counsel] is in the mid-range. One
211. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 235 n.39
(1993).
212. Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer's Response to Organizational
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House
Counsel, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 241,246 (2002). See generally Andrew Crane, Are You Ethical?
Please Tick Yes or No, On Researching Ethics in Business Organizations, 20 J. Bus.
ETHICS 237 (1999) (critically reviewing the current state of empirical ethics research);
D.M. Randall & A.M. Gibson, Methodology in Business Ethics Research: A Review and
Critical Assessment, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 457 (1990) (reviewing ninety-four studies published
between 1982 and 1990).
213. See Robert C. Ford & Woodrow D. Richardson, Ethical Decision-Making: A
Review of the Empirical Literature, 13 J. Bus. ETHICS 205, 219 (1994) (reviewing findings
on the comparative importance of individual and situational factors in ethical decision-
making).
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thing that kind of bothered me-I complained about my
compensation a bit and was told I should bring in clients and it's
like, when am I going to service those clients? My hours are
worse than full-time outside practice. I go from first thing in
the morning to late at night because of the people on the West
Coast. I get phone calls all day Saturday at home. I work 250-
300 hours per month.
Q. Do you think you will stay in this position?
A. Yes, I enjoy it. It never gets boring. It is like litigation
without two years of discovery. Motions to disqualify in a big
case are really exciting-it is a trial within a trial-so you get to
do the whole nine yards, but without two years of
interrogatories. So it's never dull. Okay, conflicts searches are
dull. But it is interesting, ethics. It is what being a lawyer is all
about. The tenets of professional conduct. I also enjoy
knowing everyone in the firm. And when you help someone
out, they are really grateful. When you clear a conflict no one
thinks you could clear, you get two clients instead of one.
Q. You should get origination credits.
A. I'm going to be working on that. It's a fun job.
[Vol. 841572
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VI. APPENDICES
Appendix A. Characteristics of Respondents and Firms
2001-2002 2005 Combined
N N sample
(% of total (% of total 2005 Total N2001-2002 (% of combinedsample) sample) sample)
INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS 32(67%) 16(33%) 48(100%)
Gender
Male 27 (84%) 14 (88%) 41 (85%)
Female 5 (16%) 2(13%) 7 (15%)
Titles* Including Words
"Counsel" 10(31%) 9(56%) 19 (40%)
"Ethics/PR" 7(22%) 3(19%) 10(21%)
"Risk/Loss" 2(6%) 2(13%) 4(8%)
"Committee" 13(41%) 6(38%) 19 (40%)
Structure of Position
Full-time 10(31%) 5(31%) 15 (31%)
Part-time, Compensated 5 (16%) 6 (38%) 11 (23%)
Part-time, Uncompensated 16(50%) 5(31%) 21(44%)
Missing 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
Appointment
Inside 30 (94%) 13 (81%) 4 9%
Outside 2 (6%) 3 (19%) 5 (10%)
FIRMS 32 (68%) 15 (32%) 47 (100%)
Size
35-100 5 (16%) 3(20%) 8 (17%)
151-250 6(19%) 1(7%) 7(15%)
251-500 10 (31%) 2(13%) 12 (26%)
501-999 7 (22%) 6 (40%) 13 (28%)
1,000+ 4(13%) 3(20%) 7(15%)
Location
East Coast 23 (72%) 8 (53%) 31(66%)
Midwest 7 (22%) 5 (33%) 12 (26%)
Other 2 (6%) 2 (13%) 4 (9%)
Percentage does not equal 100% because not all titles are included and some respondents
have more than one title.
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I. List of Respondents by Firm Size and Structure of
Position
Respondent Firm Size Structure of Position Outside
ID Category Appointment
Al 251-500 Full Time
A2 251-500 Part Time, Compensated
A3 501-999 Part Time, Volunteer
A4 501-999 Part Time, Volunteer
A5 1,000 + Part Time, Volunteer
A6 251-500 Part Time, Volunteer
A7 501-999 Full Time
A8 1,000 + Full Time
A9 151-250 Part Time, Compensated
A10 1,000 + Part Time, Compensated
All 251-500 Full Time
A12 151-250 Full Time
A13 35-150 Full Time
A14 501-999 Part Time, Compensated Yes
B1 251-500 Missing
B2 501-999 Part Time, Volunteer
B3 251-500 Part Time, Volunteer
B4 501-999 Full Time
B5 151-250 Part Time, Volunteer
B6 251-500 Part Time, Volunteer
B7 151-250 Part Time, Volunteer
B8 151-250 Part Time, Volunteer
B9 151-250 Part Time, Volunteer
B10 251-500 Full Time
Bl1 1,000 + Full Time
.84
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Respondent Firm Size Structure of Position Outside
ID Category Appointment
Cl 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
C2 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
C3 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
C4 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
IA 501-999 Part Time, Volunteer
IB 251-500 Full Time Yes
IC 251-500 Part Time, Compensated
I1 251-500 Full Time Yes
12 501-999 Part Time, Compensated
13 151-250 Part Time, Compensated
14 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
15 251-500 Part Time, Volunteer
16 501-999 Part Time, Volunteer
17 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
18 35-150 Part Time, Volunteer
19 Same as A2 Part Time, Compensated
110 501-999 Full Time
Ill 501-999 Full Time
112 1,000+ Full Time Yes
01 501-999 Part Time, Compensated
02 501-999 Part Time, Compensated
03 1,000 + Part Time, Compensated
04 1,000 + Full Time Yes
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